

AXIOMA  
C E N T E R

# *Migration and Ethics*

THE AXIOMS OF A CHRISTIAN MIGRATION POLICY





# **Migration and Ethics**

The Axioms of a Christian  
Migration Policy



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Migration Policy

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**Editorial policy statement:** As an independent Christian Hungarian think tank, we strive to live up to our ecumenical values by acknowledging respectfully the reverence with which Christian believers treat their saintly and apostolic authorities. For this reason, any individuals mentioned by name who are considered saints in one or more Christian denominational traditions are referred to with the prefix ‘St.’ Hence, Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Oriental Orthodox, and Lutheran saintly figures are described with this nomenclature.

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The crisis of migration for families and nations has become acute around the world. At stake is the survival of Western civilization itself. The solutions, however, are all within reach. Where Liberal Migration Policy decimated families and deracinated nations, Axioma gives us Christian Migration Policy as the solution. “Migration and Ethics” not only aptly diagnoses the problems we all face, but they have produced an in-depth set of classical and Christian axioms which are accessible to policy-makers of all stripes. This is an essential white paper for re-building a Christian civilization.

DR CHAD C. PECKNOLD  
The Catholic University of America

Until now, migration has been an intensely controversial topic of discourse. For Copts in Hungary, migration is understood as a matter of escaping from imminent danger, or from life situations that are catastrophic to human dignity. For Europeans instead, as receivers, migration is either understood as meaning a flood of peoples that overwhelms the local society, or as a moral obligation compelled by the weight of history and global inequality. However, neither of these understandings is able to catch the reality of the situation, or the many challenges that come with it.

The reality of Christian persecution and migration in our age follows a well-known pattern: Christians in the Middle East, in Africa, and also in other parts of the world are losing their collective homes. For that reason, many of them have come to European nations like Hungary, to build a new, beautiful, shining home here. We wish to live in harmony with our Christian neighbors, whether they are Protestant, Catholic, or anything else.

This is one of the great challenges of our modern times, and I am glad that Axioma, in this whitepaper, proposes to deal with that challenge from a perspective that is grounded in Christian ethics and human truths. This study also helps us appreciate that well-ordered and responsibly maintained borders also serve to protect communities and create the conditions for genuine hospitality. It encourages us to see not only the human stories behind migration, but also the moral responsibility of stewarding our societies with care and fairness.

REV. FR. YOUSSEF KHALIL  
St. Mary & Archangel Michael Coptic Church of Budapest

The publication reflects on today's migration crises with scientific rigor and offers political and social guidance based on Christian values for a complex global problem involving many actors. The authors' well-structured analyses and concrete proposals help readers to approach the issue of migration on the basis of comprehensive moral and practical considerations. These recommendations are particularly timely in today's political climate, where migration issues are often the subject of polarized discourse. The publication is also significant for research into the social and ethical aspects of migration and can serve as a basis for the formulation of migration policies that respect human dignity, both in Hungary and on the international stage.

DR JÓZSEF KALÓ  
Ludovika University

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# Introduction and Objectives

**Technology. Instability. Migration.** These three interconnected phenomena have become defining fixtures of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Their immense influence and impact on human affairs, both globally and locally, is itself a consequence of their interconnectedness. For instance, the global spread of internet access and smartphone ownership over the last two decades has dramatically boosted the pull-type factors behind West-bound migration (citizens of Third World countries open their devices and see a beautiful, shining Western world seeming eager to welcome them).

Similarly, as political instability increases around the world, the ‘push’ factor of migration increases also. Multiple waves of massive human movement toward the United States and Europe can be traced to instability crises in recent years: these include the 2015 wave associated with the Syrian civil war, and the 2022 wave associated with the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.

But migration, which fundamentally consists of the large-scale movement of peoples across geographic or political borders, has many varieties; legal and illegal, regular and irregular, permanent and temporary, wanted and unwanted, erstwhile ‘economic migration’ and refugee or asylum-seeking.

**TECHNOLOGY. ”**  
**INSTABILITY.**  
**MIGRATION**

While these distinctions do matter, we must remember that *legal* immigrants can and often do overstay visas, thus becoming *illegal* immigrants. Similarly, temporary migrants on student or work visas may become *permanent*, or seek *refugee status*, if or when war breaks out in their home country. The differing types of status and their legality are, of course, important, but so too are the numbers of people coming, and where they come from.

Yet for over a decade, global leaders in the Western world, particularly within the European Union, have dismissed objections to mass migration (whether legal or illegal, wanted

“ INEVITABLE,  
NECESSARY,  
AND BENEFICIAL

or unwanted) while simultaneously urging us to believe that this mass movement of peoples is **inevitable, necessary, and beneficial**.<sup>1</sup> The quasi-religious axioms embedded in this migration doctrine, and the urgent need to

revise them to suit the present and future realities of mass human movement (not only for Hungary but also elsewhere on the Continent and in the broader Western world) are the focus of this white paper.

As it stands, migration (particularly mass migration) can create, and sometimes does create, threats to the **life, liberty and property** of native peoples in Christian-heritage countries that receive it. The imbalanced nature of these threats in relation to the ostensible benefits of migration as perceived by native citizens leads to tension in the political and cultural spheres of migration-target countries, as analyzed in chapters of this white paper.

This paper weighs the challenges posed by mass migration in relation to societal, economic, and political impacts on migration-target countries in light of Christian principles—human dignity, the common good, and the Christian concept of *oikos* (the place of collective striving toward human flourishing and Christian social life). Through this exposition, actionable and attainable solutions are presented, and these solutions (in the form of policy recommendations) are emphasized in the summary and conclusions section at the end of this booklet.

The primary goal of this study is to demonstrate that, through the analysis of the migration phenomenon in its various forms, we can arrive at tangible policy solutions that are both reasonable and ethically grounded in Christian understandings. With this bottom-up principles-first methodology firmly in hand, we aim to arrive at best practices and protocols that can be widely shared to inform current and future governance on migration-related issues.

LIFE, ”  
LIBERTY,  
PROPERTY



**Part 1:**  
**The Migration  
Phenomenon**



# 1.1. Christian Communities and the Stakes of Migration

## The Case of Lebanon

*“The original idea that served as a basis for the establishment of the Lebanese state was to make it into a refuge for all the Christians of the orient”*—from the letters of Elias Peter Hoayek, Maronite Catholic Patriarch, in writing to the French government.<sup>2</sup>

On the 22<sup>nd</sup> of November 1943, a miracle in the history of the world took place. On that date, the French government released political prisoners detained for their proclamation of the independent state of Lebanon—a *de facto* recognition of its independence. This was, from the standpoint of history, an anomaly. For more than a millennium, Christians in the Middle East had existed in varyingly extreme conditions of persecution, hostility, and oppression. Suddenly, there burst onto the world stage a country which Arabic-speaking Christians could call home. Not only Maronites (Lebanese Catholics) but also Antiochian Orthodox (of the Eastern Communion) and Syriac Orthodox (of the Oriental Communion) Christians rejoiced at the abrupt overturn of centuries of oppressive precedent. At last, there was a place where they belonged.

Merely five years later, another historically miraculous event occurred in the form of the foundation of the state of Israel. On May 14, 1948, the assertion of the rights of a particular people-group to their homeland was declared once again for the second time in a decade. Yet this declaration came with certain consequences. The aftermath of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 (in

☾☾ **SUNNI ISLAMIC EXTREMISM...  
GREW AND GREW WITHIN WHAT WAS  
OSTENSIBLY A CHRISTIAN LEBANON**

which Lebanon took part, despite bitter internal opposition from the Maronite Christian leadership)

saw almost a million Palestinian refugees dispersed around neighboring countries in the Middle East; these included Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and also Lebanon. These dispersed Palestinian refugees who migrated to Lebanon, mostly Sunni Muslims, exceeded 100,000 in number—and they grew rapidly.

Largely exempt from the Lebanese constitutional framework due to their refugee status, Palestinian refugees established a parallel society characterized by anti-Zionism, anti-Semitism, and Sunni Islamic extremism that grew and grew within what was ostensibly a Christian Lebanon. The demographic shift intensified following Black September in 1970, when additional Palestinian militants and refugees were expelled from Jordan and relocated to Lebanon, prompting fearful Lebanese Christians to leave their homeland for foreign shores. Over time, non-Christian populations grew, remaining apart from the framework that Christian Lebanon was founded upon, while becoming increasingly involved in paramilitary and radical activities. The

balance of power between Lebanon's confessional communities eroded, and in 1975, the country descended into a 15-year civil war driven by sectarian violence and foreign intervention.<sup>3</sup> One scholar comments, "...by the end of the civil war in 1990, the Lebanese Christian community was powerless, exhausted, and it was more divided than any time before."<sup>4</sup>

Today in 2025, Lebanon is no longer a Christian homeland in any meaningful sense. The country's demographic composition has been irreversibly altered: where Christians once formed a 53% majority, they now amount to a meager 38% of the population in what has become a Muslim-majority country, according to current statistical estimates.<sup>5</sup> The state's institutions are weakened: even the Lebanese military is an insignificant player in comparison to Hezbollah—an Iran-backed Shi'ite extremist group that declares wars and dictates foreign policy, often at the expense of the Lebanese people.<sup>6</sup> The present state of Lebanon is one in which a historically miraculous event—the emergence of an independent Christian state in the homeland of Christianity—was reversed, and the prosperity of its people strangled. None of this would have been possible were it not for **mass migration**.

### 1.1.1. What is mass migration?

*"Migrants are, of course, more than just workers; they are individuals with their own loyalties, rivalries and belief systems. Immigration is not just a shift from one place to another; it is also*

*a shift from one culture to another with repercussions spanning generations.*”—Migration Watch UK<sup>7</sup>

Migration denotes the phenomenon of human movement across a contextually salient boundary, which may be linguistic, cultural, political, or geographical in nature. To migrate is to pass from one zone to another. After the dawn of agriculture roughly 10,000 years ago, human existence across the globe rapidly shifted toward a sedentary mode of living, where communities are bound to a specific zone of habitation (an area of land) constituting their collective home. Because settled

“**SHARED CIVIC PLACE ORIENTED  
TOWARD A COLLECTIVE  
SET OF NORMS, EXPECTATIONS,  
LOYALTIES, BEHAVIORS, AND NEEDS**

societies depend upon the land they inhabit to obtain food, protection from the elements, and to sustain their

communities, they are bounded to these zones as a matter of collective survival. Well before the birth of Christ, human societies and their zones of occupation were understood unanimously to be **non-neutral** in character.<sup>8</sup> Society itself was, and is, recognized as a **shared civic place oriented toward a collective set of norms, expectations, loyalties, behaviors, and needs**. The costs and risks associated with migrating from one such shared civic place, with all the baggage that entails, into another were therefore a relatively uncommon affair.

When large-scale migration *did* occur historically, it was often viewed as a sign of calamity, either because of its necessitating factors (such as drought, famine, or flooding)<sup>9</sup> or because it

took the form of an invasion, with one group exerting force to take control over the resources and populations of a different zone, along with its inhabitants. Examples of the second type (migration as invasion) include the Barbarian Invasions of Late Antiquity, which caused (or at least contributed to) the collapse of the Western Roman Empire by the end of the 5<sup>th</sup> century. Another example would be the Islamic Invasions of the 7<sup>th</sup> century, which resulted in the conquest, subjugation, and dwindling (or indeed outright extinction) of most Christian populations native to the Middle East and North Africa.<sup>10</sup>

Today, when we talk about mass migration in the present tense, what we really mean is something quite

**different;** something for which comparable historical precedent cannot be easily found during peacetime.<sup>11</sup> As such, we operationally define **mass migration** as the large-scale movement of persons or peoples into foreign countries for long-term residential purposes, **straining the capacity of the recipient state or society to absorb or integrate these migrants without incurring substantial costs to itself.**

A recent report by the Hoover Institution observed that at least 29 million migrants, both legal and illegal, had entered Europe in the decade between 2014 and 2024, thus **“straining the Continent’s already overstretched and largely dysfunctional immigration system.”**<sup>12</sup> This is corroborated by the UN IOM’s 2024 report, indicating that **Europe has become the top migration destination** in the world, with highly

STRAINING THE CAPACITY  
OF THE RECIPIENT STATE



sophisticated “migration corridors” guaranteeing the continuity of access for more aspiring migrants in years to come.<sup>13</sup>

The number of international migrants has increased in all UN regions, but has increased to a greater degree in Europe and Asia than in other regions.




Figure 1: International migrant population by world region, from 1990–2020<sup>14</sup>

Fundamentally, there is no easy way to verify or ascertain the identities of many of these migrants; research suggests that the boxed categories state authorities rely upon (i.e., ‘refugee,’ ‘migrant,’ ‘asylum seeker’) are unreliable, and frequently mutate over the duration of a migrant’s stay in his or her destination country.<sup>15</sup> As the historical experience of Lebanon

shows, people entering as refugees may, after a while decide to settle down permanently—while making a few modifications (reorganizing the house, so to speak) so that their new home better suits their wants and needs. De Haas et al. (2020) note that “the experience of migration and of living in another country often leads to modification of original plans, so that migrants’ intentions at the time of departure are poor predictors of actual behaviour.”<sup>16</sup>

We distill and condense the aforementioned findings and observations (historical and present-day) into the following preliminary conclusions:

- That **migration can harm Christian communities**—as believers in Christ who desire and deserve the freedom to practice their religion with other believers of their denomination within the universal church.
- That **migration can be bad for migrants**—whose arrival in disruptively large numbers can create conflicts that erode the cohesion of the shared civic space they move into, resulting in unfulfilled dreams, wants, and expectations, fueling intergenerational resentment and antagonism, to the detriment of the common good and human dignity.
- That **migration can permanently transform the collective cultural homelands of people-groups in Christian-heritage countries into confused and chaotic hostels filled with competing interests**—demographically transforming societies and making people minorities in their own homes.

MIGRATION   
CAN HARM  
CHRISTIAN  
COMMUNITIES

### **1.1.2. More than markets: the migration discourse and its ethical shortcomings**

In modern political discourse, migration is typically treated as a technical issue—a utility that can be used to improve economic performance (particularly in the case of labor markets), a solution to lagging birth rates (i.e., demographic decline), or as the fulfillment of a political consensus agreement (e.g., international law obligations).<sup>17</sup> This technocratic framing of migration as merely a matter of market performance in specific metrics reduces migration from a complex human phenomenon to a simple numbers game, in which ethical values are treated as functionally irrelevant. In practical terms, however, it should be emphasized that addressing local problems by importing non-local human capital introduces various complex challenges that this discourse fails to take into consideration.

Let us consider an example. Table 1 outlines a hypothetical case study of a governmental strategy aimed at improving the economic performance of its tech sector amidst ongoing labor shortages by enlisting immigrant workers. In this model, the stated objectives (A) of this strategy are concrete, achievable, and coherent responses to the labor shortage problem at hand. Each of these objectives is matched with an adverse corollary (B); an undesired but predictable consequence of the strategy's implementation. Lastly, there are unintended consequences (C): outcomes which are neither inevitable nor intended, but

Table 1: Migration and Economic Impact Matrix

| Host Country   | Migrant Type  | Objectives (A)   | Adverse Corollary (B)  | Unintended Consequences (C)  |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| Middle-income EU country suffering from labor shortages in tech & IT sectors | High-skilled tech & IT workers, recruited from developing economies         | Increase labor pool to address domestic skill shortages                            | Native wages in the sector stagnate due to increased supply                                      | Top-tier native workers seek better opportunities abroad (i.e., <b>native capital emigration</b> or 'brain drain') |
|  |   | Native firms recruit more expert-level tech talent domestically                    | Employers deprioritize training of junior workers  | Increased expectations on junior tech graduates, who suffer from lower employability                               |
|  | Improve economic output by numerically boosting human capital (tech talent) | Uneven development as tech jobs concentrate in urban zones                         | Rural-urban divide worsens; political polarization between 'connected' and 'left-behind' regions |  |
|  | Fill high-tier strategic roles to support state digitalization agendas      | Native public trust erodes when high-value jobs seem outsourced to foreign workers | Rise in anti-migration or populist political sentiment targeting 'globalist elites'              |  |

whose probability of occurring is increased because of the migration strategy set out by the government.

This impact matrix model reveals something fundamentally important. The decision to invite or accept migrants always comes with both adverse corollaries (B) and downstream risks (C). When it comes to migration policy, contemporary political discourse tends to emphasize the benefits of achieving proximal goals (A), while simultaneously ignoring the downsides and negative consequences that such decisions may demonstrably introduce. Viewed thus, the way in which contemporary discourse treats the matter of migration policy **cannot be considered fully ethical**, as the interests of stakeholders who stand to gain (technocrats, corporations, bureaucrats and in some cases political parties) are prioritized, whereas the interests of stakeholders who stand to lose are frequently left out.

“ CANNOT BE  
CONSIDERED  
FULLY ETHICAL

In conclusion, migration cannot be handled through the lens of its proximal impact alone, because to do so is to ignore the legitimate **ethical dilemmas** that relate to **second-order, non-proximal consequences** that migration brings about. Tackling these ethical dilemmas, then, can be considered a priority for policymakers and thinkers in countries that are, or will be, affected by migration in the present era.

## 1.2. Ethical Dilemmas and Migration Ethics

### Secular Problems, and Christian Solutions

*“I personally have never experienced a moral dilemma that was not resolved by biblical definition and choosing to trust God with the consequences.”—Robertson McQuilkin<sup>18</sup>*

Ethical dilemmas are situations where two or more moral principles appear to demand mutually exclusive actions, such that to choose either one necessarily requires violating another. Unlike simple conflicts of interest, wherein a policymaker (for example) may have to commit to one of two mutually exclusive interest groups based on a common ethical principle (i.e., loyalty), ethical dilemmas involve conflicts of values rather than interests. This chapter will explore these in detail, comparing secular and Christian interpretations of both problems and solutions.

In the context of the phenomenon of mass migration in the modern world, these ethical dilemmas dominate the discourse, perhaps because almost everyone—whether Christian, secular, or non-Christian—recognizes that although the acceptance or refusal of migrants is structured as a binary decision, there are real human beings and identifiable interest

groups who are stakeholders in the outcome of that decision, and two sides who claim to be morally justified in their preferred outcome. At this point, we might ask: how do secular authorities, in our secular age, understand the ethical component of migration policy as presented to policymakers?

Fortunately, a perfectly encapsulated manifesto of this secular position in migration ethics does exist, in the form of a special issue published by the *Migration Studies* in 2022.<sup>19</sup> The leading article in the special edition, authored by Austrian sociologist Rainer Bauböck and collaborators, introduces the

“ TO PROVIDE  
“SAFE PASSAGE...  
[AND] GENEROUS  
RESETTLEMENT  
OPPORTUNITIES”...

concept of “hard ethical dilemmas” in migration policymaking, defined as involving: “a persistent conflict of morally worthy goals or values that cannot be easily ‘resolved’ and that is grounded in facts and embedded in political institutions.”<sup>20</sup> To concretize and reinforce

these hard ethical dilemmas, Bauböck et al. (2022) introduce five cases (each addressed by separate articles within the issue) including:

*The ethical dilemma faced by policymakers in the Global North between “devot[ing] their resources” to provide “safe passage... [and] generous resettlement opportunities” to refugees arriving at their borders, versus “prioriti[zing] resourcing refugee protection in the Global South.”<sup>21</sup>*

In secular contexts, whether academic or political in nature, such propositions and the lengthy arguments accompanying them are taken very seriously. For Christians, on the other hand, these strong claims about ethical imperatives drawn from seemingly nowhere are often profoundly alienating, or even felt as entirely nonsensical.

The notion that countries in the Global North (such as Hungary) are imminently compelled to choose whether they should “devote their resources” to secure the safe passage of refugees and bestow them with “generous resettlement opportunities,” or instead to use their national wealth to support “refugee protection in the Global South” is an axiomatic dichotomy presented as moral fact. Needless to say, this framing of the genuine suffering of refugees worldwide (not merely in the ‘Global South’) and of the ethical quandaries that accompany such suffering is bereft of unequivocal justification in Christian Scriptures.<sup>22</sup> Certainly, there are other reasons—international legal obligations—that **do compel** countries to take action to support refugees (further explained in Chapter 2.2.). But from a Christian perspective, “[t]he purpose of the law and the exercise of civil authority is the promotion of the common good. It follows that the common good is essential to establish the legitimacy of any law. A law that runs counter to the common good is not a law in essence, and citizens do not have any moral obligation to follow it but rather, have the obligation to repeal it.”<sup>23</sup>

AXIOMATIC   
DICHOTOMY  
PRESENTED AS  
MORAL FACT

To their credit, Bauböck et al. (2022) explain why: “**in philosophical terms we are siding with value pluralism** against value monism, especially of a consequentialist bend, for which there are no genuine moral dilemmas, as it is in principle always possible to identify and choose the course of action that will have the least bad consequences.”<sup>24</sup> While Christian principles are not quite as easy to work with as the aforementioned standpoints, as we lack God’s perfect knowledge, they are different from secular value pluralism in

a fundamental way: they start from the position that problems are indeed ‘solvable.’

Under conditions of secular value pluralism, policymakers and thinkers are reduced to tragic actors, forced to choose which value to sacrifice and

which to preserve, never able to fulfill the demands of both. The framing reflects not only the inescapable complexity of migration but also the collapse of moral order in a secular world. Our thought leaders in present times suffer from **moral paralysis**, not because of a genuine moral quandary, but instead because they do not adhere to a transcendent and objective moral framework, while Christian philosophy is set aside and waits as a patient onlooker to be called upon after its liberal counterparts have had their turn.

“UNDER CONDITIONS  
OF SECULAR  
VALUE PLURALISM,  
POLICYMAKERS AND  
THINKERS ARE REDUCED  
TO TRAGIC ACTORS

### 1.2.1. Ecumenical principles for a Christian ethics of migration

It may come as a surprise to some, but giving proactive recognition to the ethical dimension when dealing with the legislation and governance of migration policy is by no means a novelty in the Christian tradition. Historically, migration was always understood to be ethically significant, to be assessed in terms of its impact on the host society, the background of the migrants (i.e., where they were coming from), and the migrants themselves (meaning, in most cases: **why are they coming here and what do they want**). Migration could be a weapon (invasion or mass disruption), a blessing (co-religious refugees escaping from persecution in lands conquered by hostile forces), a burden, or an act of compassion—depending on its nature, scale, and intent.<sup>25</sup>

Throughout Christian history, migration has been interpreted through precisely this ethical lens. St. Augustine, for example, warned of the dangers of ignoring the divine imperative to love one's neighbor above the sojourner.<sup>26</sup> In the Reformation era, both Protestant and Catholic rulers invoked Christian duty when offering asylum to co-religionists fleeing persecution, while simultaneously regulating the movement of those who might destabilize their realms.<sup>27</sup> Even in the modern period, papal encyclicals such as

**WHY ARE THEY  
COMING HERE AND  
WHAT DO THEY WANT** ”

*Exsul Familia* (1952) affirmed the right to migrate under conditions of necessity, but only within the boundaries of the receiving nation's ability to safeguard the integrity of its social and spiritual life.<sup>28</sup> Here, we describe the most important principles of Christian political and social teaching that allow for the total circumnavigation of the secular 'hard ethical dilemmas' that were described above:

## Human Dignity

Human dignity is the foundational principle of Christian anthropology. It affirms that every human being possesses inherent and inalienable worth by virtue of his or her creation in the image and likeness of God (*imago Dei*). This divine origin makes dignity something that cannot be altered or affected by merit or circumstance, but rather a quality of human persons that is intrinsic and undiminishable. From the Christian perspective, all secondary dimensions of dignity (moral, legal, social, or practical) derive their unity and coherence from this theological source.<sup>29</sup>

To speak of dignity in Christian terms is to speak of an ontological and moral reality, not a social construct. As articulated in the 2024 Catholic declaration *Dignitas Infinita*, "[the] dignity of every human being can be understood as 'infinite,'" transcending all outward appearances and specific aspects of people's lives.<sup>30</sup> This understanding is not exclusive to the Roman Catholic Church. In 2017, the 'Common Declaration of His Holiness Francis and His Holiness

Tawadros II' issued jointly by the Roman Catholic and Oriental Orthodox papacies strongly affirmed this understanding of human dignity as a core Christian principle, stating in article 7 that: "We can bear witness together to fundamental values such as the sanctity and dignity of human life, the sacredness of marriage and the family, and respect for all of creation, entrusted to us by God."<sup>31</sup>

The ontological reality of human dignity is absolute, but the moral reality of human dignity can be violated and disabused. Charles De Koninck argued that a person can lose or abuse their human dignity if they commit a mortal sin—something not directed toward the appropriate end. Coptic monk Matthew the Poor (Arabic: Mattā el-Meskīn) viewed human dignity through the Orthodox lens of *theosis*—a dynamic process where we develop into the fullness of the moral reality of our human dignity, or fail to do so through the exercise of free will.<sup>32</sup>

Human dignity is also referenced in the *Westminster Confession*—a foundational document for many Protestant and Reformed denominations.<sup>33</sup> Contra secular ideologies and other religions, Christianity holds that the inherent, God-given, inviolable worth of every person must be the basis for ethical thought and action; upholding human dignity is thus a common basis for interpersonal relationships between individual persons, and collective action by groups or collectives.<sup>34</sup>

## The Common Good

In an immediate sense, the common good refers to the ultimate *end* of political association, and instrumentally therefore of law as well. In more metaphysical and theological senses, the common good can also be understood as a referential term for

“HE EXISTS  
'WITH' OTHERS  
AND  
'FOR' OTHERS

the order of the universe in the broadest possible terms, and its ultimate *end* in God.<sup>35</sup>

The Catholic declaration *Dignitatis humanae* defines it in the following terms: “The common good of society consists in the sum total of those conditions of social life which enable people to achieve a fuller measure of perfection with greater ease.”<sup>36</sup> In a sense, this is neither a utilitarian concept, nor strictly a communitarian one either. It occupies a position between the two, envisioning a world in which the good of the individual is aligned with the good of the collective. In short, the common good is a dimension where members of certain communities provide for all members to fulfill a relational obligation. They all must care about certain interests that they have in common.<sup>37</sup>

The common good is essentially characterizable as a unity or harmony of goods by the fact that it encompasses the goods of all individuals. Because of this, the common good is superior to the individual good of each person.<sup>38</sup> As it is stated in *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*: “the human person cannot find fulfillment in himself, that is, apart from the fact that **he exists ‘with’ others and ‘for’ others.**”<sup>39</sup>

## Responsibility to protect

The moral obligation/duty of rulers and authorities to protect their citizens is both a requirement of natural reason and a moral imperative grounded in Christian teaching.

**In Eastern Christianity** (Eastern Orthodoxy and Oriental Orthodoxy), **it is believed that governments have an ethical duty to preserve the right to life** of those under their jurisdiction—with **the obligation of the ruler toward the citizen coming first.**<sup>40</sup> This is particularly present in the religious, political, social teaching propagated by St. Justinian the Great, whose laws (*Corpus Iuris Civilis*) requiring rulers to act in such a way remained in effect for the final 900 years of the Eastern Roman Empire.<sup>41</sup>

**GOVERNMENTS** »  
**HAVE AN ETHICAL**  
**DUTY TO PRESERVE**  
**THE RIGHT TO LIFE**

In the **Thomistic tradition, rulers have a natural responsibility to protect their people.** St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that a ruler who fails in this protective duty becomes a tyrant, for authority is legitimate only insofar as it serves the flourishing of the community.<sup>42</sup> Benedict XVI, in continuity with this tradition, articulated in his 2008 UN address that the “responsibility to protect” is an essential dimension of sovereignty, as authority is not mere power, but service ordered to defending human dignity.<sup>43</sup>

## ***Ordo Amoris or Ordo Caritatis***

The *Ordo Amoris* or the “order of love,” can be understood as the obligation by which Christians must first care for those entrusted directly to their care before extending charity and concern further outwards. Originating with St. Augustine of Hippo (a saint in the Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Oriental Orthodox churches),<sup>44</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas also affirms that charity, while universal in scope, must be exercised in an ordered fashion: beginning with those nearest in bonds of sociopolitical community (i.e., the immediate family and local community), before radiating outward thereafter, proposition that is known by the name of *Ordo Caritatis* “order of charity.”<sup>45</sup> Prioritizing the well-being, justice, and flourishing of one’s nation does not contradict Christian universalism; rather, it gives one the starting point from which to live out those universal principles of charity, love, and protection, which can thereby radiate outward to all the nations of the world.

## **Subsidiarity**

Subsidiarity teaches that action should begin at the closest level of responsibility, it is not merely an abstract concept but rooted in real-life, concrete obligations to those closest to us.<sup>46</sup> In the concept of subsidiarity, our human dignity compels every one of us to play a role in ensuring the common good, and “subsidiarity respects personal dignity by recognizing in the person a subject who is always capable of giving something

to others. By considering reciprocity as the heart of what it is to be a human being, subsidiarity is the most effective antidote against any form of all-encompassing welfare state.<sup>47</sup> If we apply subsidiarity always with an eye to human dignity, it will be the most effective framework for mostly all our problems. A similar concept can be found in the Russian Orthodox concept of ‘sobornost,’ which has been argued by Dylan Pahman of the Acton Institute to be a functional parallel to the Catholic concept of subsidiarity.<sup>48</sup>

In a modern world, however, subsidiarity is “concerned with the relationship between national, supra-national and local governments.”<sup>49</sup> Subsidiarity is a principle which requires trust from higher authorities, and above all, trust, that it is (the subsidiarity) capable of serving the common good.<sup>50</sup>

## **Christian *Oikos***

While the other Christian principles in our list are firmly established through the social and political teaching of the church, we will also highlight an additional Biblical concept that has received more extensive attention in the Orthodox and Evangelical traditions than in the Catholic one. This is the concept of Christian *Oikos*—derived from the Greek word for *home*—*oikos* (οἶκος). In the New Testament, the word is used 117 times, and in the Septuagint it has more than 1,000 instances of use, translating the Hebrew word *bayt* (בַּיִת).<sup>51</sup>

*Oikos* is the ordered relational sphere where family, community, and faith converge. Emerging from the early

church house gatherings, the *oikos* embodies hospitality, communion (*koinonia*), and mutual support, while also serving as a microcosm of political life, where natural law provides the standard for justice and the common good, because of this, it is called “the whole household of God.”<sup>52</sup> In this sense, the Christian *oikos* has a spiritual and social function, both of which cannot exist or be sustained without the other: “What we see (Saint) Paul doing here in Acts 16 is intentionally using the *oikos* as a vehicle for spreading the Gospel. Rather than lead a single individual to Christ outside of their family and social context, Paul proclaims the Gospel not only to them but then seeks out their families. He then sought to bring them into faith and to follow the Lord in water baptism as a Household.”<sup>53</sup>

By being social, the *oikos* becomes political too, as it grounds human dignity and flourishing in concrete communities, safeguards cultural identity, and provides the foundation for the polis. The 2020 document *For the Life of the World: Toward a Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church* released by the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople speaks about ecology and the necessity of taking care of our common home or *oikos*, in a human sense as well as in the sense of faithful stewardship of our human cultures as well.<sup>54</sup>

When applied to reality, at any level, the pillars of the Christian *oikos* are three: “economic justice (the *nomoi* or regulations within the household), ecological sustainability (the *logos* or underlying principles of the household) and ecumenical fellowship (*oikoumene*—participating as members of the whole household of God).”<sup>55</sup>

## Conclusions

The Christian principles given here are not intended to be used in the same manner as the Ten Commandments. Rather, they provide the normative foundation that should be used by every Christian leader and thinker when approaching the complex challenges presented by the phenomenon of mass migration in the modern world. In this way, Christian ethics—rather than secular ethics—constitutes a framework for avoiding the **moral paralysis** of so-called ‘hard ethical dilemmas,’ which are only dilemmas in the first place when viewed through a relativist lens, as acknowledged by Bauböck et al. Christian rulers, thinkers, citizens, and even Christian societies as a whole must reject the validity of these ‘dilemmas’ outright. For an omniscient and all-loving God, there **are no true dilemmas**, for the moral law (which exists objectively in and with God, eternally and transcending time and space)<sup>56</sup> is itself perfect truth, for which there exists no such thing as a contradiction between values or priorities.

At the same time, Christians are confronted with an inherent setback that also impacts our approach to the moral quandaries imposed by migration: that is, **sin**. In the Christian worldview, it is our fallen nature that separates us from God, even though we ourselves are created in His image. For this reason, we must simultaneously strive to seek God’s wisdom and perfect truth, while acknowledging also that for us, with

**MORAL PARALYSIS  
IS NOT A DILEMMA** ””

our limitations, apparent dilemmas may arise. The conclusion, then, is to strive forward as best as we can. In rejecting the so-called dilemmas of our time, Christians are not ignoring complexity—they are confronting it with clarity. As policy-makers and citizens, our task is not to agonize endlessly over irresolvable conflicts, but to do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly—always in truth.<sup>57</sup>

# 1.3. Hungary, Christianity, and Migration

## Governance Principles and Historical Context

*“But if anyone does not provide for his own, and especially for those of his household, he has denied the faith and is worse than an unbeliever.”—1 Timothy 5:8*

The first pages of Christian scripture tell the story of God’s creation of a homeland and its inhabitants. From the time of the Garden of Eden, all creatures—animal, human, and angelic—are associated with specific places of inhabitation; something that in common language, we typically refer to as a home. The Biblical *oikos* has many definitions, among which is the definition of a place for collective self-expression of a people: where they can fully live out their lives as a unique ‘us’ that cannot be replicated or reproduced by other peoples.<sup>58</sup>

**HUNGARIAN CHRISTIANS  
HAVE ONLY ONE SUCH  
HOME IN THE WHOLE  
WORLD: THAT IS, HUNGARY** »

Whether they are ardent churchgoing believers or merely cultural Christians, **Hungarian Christians have only one such home in the whole world:** that is, Hungary. The Hungarian

Constitution defines Hungary as a ‘homeland,’<sup>59</sup> as a “part of Christian Europe,” and moreover grants official recognition to the role of Christianity in preserving the nation.<sup>60</sup> But what does this mean, and how should it inform state policy with respect to migration?

### **1.3.1. St. Justinian the Great—a precedent for Christian governance on migration and ethics**

St. Justinian the Great (Ιουστινιανός ο Μέγας) ruled the Roman Empire as Emperor between 527–565 AD, and oversaw its greatest resurgence since the fall of the Western Empire to Germanic invaders during the late 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> centuries. From a Christian perspective, St. Justinian is significant not only because of his authorship of the *Justinian Code*<sup>61</sup> (a foundational document in Western law) but also because of his legal decree formally defining the Empire as an “Orthodox Republic”—putting Christianity first, and economic concerns in second place.<sup>62</sup> If we wish to obtain an ideal for how migration governance might operate in a Christian polity, this historical example can be of benefit.

During the 530s, the imperial capital of Constantinople saw recurring waves of mass migration from the Western Balkans.<sup>63</sup> The migrants were Latins—ancestral citizens of Western Rome and its provinces, at a time when the Western Empire had ceased to exist, and could not offer them its

protection. St. Justinian himself was a Latin migrant who was born and raised in the Western Balkans, yet as emperor, he recognized the social discontent and growing resentment created by the influx of Latin migrants and refugees. St. Justinian—as a Latin, as the ruler of a Christian ‘Orthodox Republic,’ and as Emperor, then passed legislation to restrict, regulate, and disincentivize further migration by Latins into the capital city, on the basis that this migration had become a cause of unnecessary social and ethnic tensions.<sup>64</sup> Most notably, his legislation explicitly considers the hardships of migrants and refugees from an ethical standpoint, beseeching them to: *“avoid abandoning their homelands and leading a wretched life over here, perhaps dying deprived of what is theirs, and without even the benefit of their ancestral burial-grounds.”*<sup>65</sup>

In this quotation, we can clearly relate St. Justinian’s strong emotional and ethical concerns for the Christian principles referred to earlier, the common good, human dignity, and the concept of Christian *Oikos*, all of which he saw as being violated or disrupted by the impact of mass migration. Most importantly of all, these were Christian migrants, of the same ethnic and cultural affiliation as their ruler, and yet still the disruptive impact of their migration into Greek lands caused him to act in favor of the native Greek Christians in his edict. In being able to discern when migration goes too far and becomes not only harmful but also unethical, St. Justinian set standards for Christian governance that Christian political leaders should strive to live up to in modern times.

### 1.3.2. St. Stephen of Hungary —a precedent for Hungarian hospitality and migration acceptance

When its capital city of Constantinople finally fell in 1453, the Eastern Roman Empire—once ruled by St. Justinian—was ended forever. Many of its former citizens, however, fled as refugees to Hungary, where they were welcomed. Subsequently, these refugees made immense contributions to the Corvinian Renaissance, the arrival enriching the intellectual and cultural life of the Hungarian nation.<sup>66</sup> The Byzantines, who had a history of cultural exchange and relations with the Hungarians dating back almost 600 years by that point in time, were welcomed into Hungary not only because they were refugees but also because they had a clear path for integration into the fabric of the host society.<sup>67</sup> That path for integration and assimilation was established by another ruler-saint: St. Stephen of Hungary.

St. Stephen (*Szent István*) was the first Christian king of Hungary. To this day, he is viewed by Christian, secular, and even Jewish Hungarians as the founder of their nation, the progenitor of what would evolve into our Hungary of the present day. Under St. Stephen's authorship and supervision, a guidebook for rulership<sup>68</sup> known as the *Admonitions* (*Intelmek*) was produced, ostensibly for his son and heir St. Emeric (*Szent Imre*).<sup>69</sup> This political guidebook extensively deals with the subject of migration from the viewpoint of a just Christian

ruler, reminding us of the lessons learned for determining engagement with the phenomenon, in present, past, and future.

In the *Admonitions*, two approaches that engage with Christian ethics in the context of migration are present: first, an initial inclusive hospitality, and second, an emphasis on the common good for Christian Hungary. The document views guests and strangers as potential benefactors to the country, invoking Ancient Rome as a supportive parallel example. It describes how “diverse languages and usages, and diverse learning and arms, [...] adorn the royal palace and render magnificent the court.” “For a kingdom of one tongue, or of one custom, is weak and fragile. Wherefore I bid you, my son, support those persons with a good will, and treat them fairly, that they may prefer to continue with you rather than to live elsewhere.”<sup>70</sup>

Although St. Stephen perceives a particular kind of economic and political benefit from foreigners and integration, his propositions are always grounded in Christian ethical considerations. In St. Stephen’s time,<sup>71</sup> it was understood that the ethical conduct of a political ruler and the ‘destiny’ of his people and polity were interconnected; the strength of Christian Hungary depended on its performance in living up to the values of the faith. Accordingly, St. Stephen emphasizes the importance of preserving the Christian faith and protecting the Church for the thriving of a nation which would be both Christian and Hungarian. In what is arguably the crux of the *Admonitions*, St. Stephen writes:

*“Be merciful to all who are suffering violence, keeping always in your heart the example of the Lord who said: ‘I desire mercy and not sacrifice.’ [...] Be patient with everyone, not only with the powerful but also with the weak. Finally, be strong lest prosperity lift you up too much or adversity cast you down.”<sup>72</sup>*

“ BE MERCIFUL TO ALL  
WHO ARE  
SUFFERING VIOLENCE

Here, Saint-King Stephen speaks to the core demands of good Christian governance just as clearly as Saint-Emperor Justinian had spoken five centuries prior, showing another (equally valid) side of the core concerns for dealing with migration phenomena. The Christian ruler must be hospitable, merciful, and patient—to the powerful and the powerless alike. Nevertheless, the Christian ruler must be a source of strength; in personal affairs, in politics, in matters of war, and in the strength of Christian communities that live under his jurisdiction.<sup>73</sup>

### **1.3.3. The alternative to good governance: a painful reminder**

Having considered the governance approach of two saints and Christian rulers (one Roman, one Hungarian) in the context of engagement with migration, it is worthwhile to briefly remind ourselves what can happen when we fail (fail to be

strong, fail to be ethical, fail to be prudent, or even fail to remain Christian). Historian Balázs Sudár writes:

*“When Hungarians today consider the period of their history in which a part of Hungary was dominated by the Ottomans, they have a time in mind that is gone for good, without a trace, although it caused grave problems and had long-lasting consequences back in history.”*<sup>74</sup>

This is correct. Today, Hungarian culture preserves little remembrance toward the brutal reality of Islamic domination that began after the national defeat at Mohács in 1526. Following this event, Hungarian Christians in Ottoman-controlled territories were reduced to ‘dhimmi’ status; second-class inhabitants whose lives were circumscribed by discriminatory taxation and the constant threat of enslavement. Hundreds of churches, including some of Hungary’s greatest medieval cathedrals, were converted into mosques; in Buda, Pécs, and Eger, the Islamic call to prayer replaced the bells of Christian worship.<sup>75</sup> Monasteries were looted, and the Christian population within the city of Buda was reduced to a total of just 70 individuals, give or take.<sup>76</sup>

This ‘forgotten era’ (as per Sudár) was a period of profound social and religious rupture, in which the spiritual and civic order of Hungary was forcibly subordinated to an alien,

**THE SPIRITUAL  
AND CIVIC ORDER  
OF HUNGARY  
WAS FORCIBLY  
SUBORDINATED  
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THEOCRATIC POWER**

theocratic power. Simply put: when Hungary lost its cultural, political, and religious sovereignty at the hands of an invading Islamic power, Christian Hungarians suffered. This alone is sufficient reason for caution about how Hungary should engage with migration in the present and future—particularly when migrants are coming from Muslim-majority societies.

In conclusion, we propose that Hungary, as a culturally and constitutionally Christian country in the European Union that has extensive historical experience with migration (both good and bad), must hold tightly to the best examples set by both national and foreign Christian rulers of the past. Rather than blindly following the world, which is condemnable for all Christians (Romans 12:2), Hungary should strive to emulate the prudence, intelligence, and virtuousness exhibited in the precedent set out by the two rulers discussed in this chapter.

**Part 2:**  
**Present-Day  
Migration,  
Problems,  
and Political  
Realities**



## 2.1. Human Migration in the Present Day

### Migrants, Motivations, Technology

Before people become migrants, they must first be ‘potential migrants’—people who aspire to move to another country for the purpose of residing there. A 2018 Gallup survey indicated that there may be 750 million potential migrants around the world; people who would move if they were able to.<sup>77</sup> In practice, this means relocating to a first-world country such as the United States (the most attractive destination for aspiring migrants globally)<sup>78</sup> or any country within Europe (particular countries being generally left unspecified in surveys).<sup>79</sup> The real number of potential migrants, however, appears to be far higher than this if we take into consideration more granular data collected in specific surveyed countries. For example, a 2019 Pew Research study found that 45% of the population of Nigeria (numbering 227 million and growing fast) intends to migrate to other countries within the next five years.<sup>80</sup>

But should these intentions be taken at face value? If so, then why haven’t half of all Nigerians turned up on the shores of Europe or the U.S. Southern Border in the five years since Pew Research concluded their survey? The 2024 UN World Migration Report addresses this, noting that:

**750 MILLION**   
**POTENTIAL**  
**MIGRANTS**  
**AROUND**  
**THE WORLD**

*“...intentions do not always result in migration outcomes, and much of the research has adopted a tiered approach to contemplations of migration that involve different stages (such as ‘desire,’ ‘exploration/planning,’ ‘preparation’ and ‘down/actual payment’), finding overall that as the process progresses over time, fewer and fewer people are able to maintain their desire and realize their migration intention, and those in the final ‘payment’ category are typically very small in number and proportion.”<sup>81</sup>*

In other words, many people across the globe fantasize about migrating to another country perceived to offer better prospects, so as to have a better life.<sup>82</sup> Yet most people do not take active measures in pursuit of that fantasy. This is supported by the aforementioned Pew Research study, which shows diminishing preparedness for actualizing a real-world migration journey as the aspirant progresses through the steps required for their journey.

**Among those who plan to migrate: in preparation to move to another country, % who have...**




Figure 2: Many Tunisians, Nigerians and Kenyans have made preparations to migrate<sup>83</sup>

### 2.1.1. Migration drivers in the European context

The Joint Research Centre of the European Commission identifies eight principal drivers of human migration: demographic, economic, environmental, socio-cultural, political, security, human development, and supranational. Each of these drivers encompasses both push and pull factors, with push factors referring to deficiencies in the country of origin and pull factors denoting perceived advantages in destination countries.<sup>84</sup>

Among these eight, at least four can be categorized as primarily material: **economic, environmental, security, and human development.**<sup>85</sup> These drivers are extensively studied, as they relate directly to migrants' pursuit of well-being. Their material nature makes them observable and more amenable to policy interventions.

In contrast, the **demographic, socio-cultural, political, and supranational** drivers occupy a more ambiguous space. These are not strictly material, but instead represent complex structural and institutional conditions that underpin material improvements. As such, they necessitate more integrative analytical approaches, including political economy, sociology, and international relations, to be adequately addressed.

However, existing literature tends to overlook what may be termed a 'symbolic driver' of migration, one largely immaterial. This driver is rooted in the subjective perceptions and aspirations of migrants,<sup>86</sup> often encapsulated in notions such as the

“American Dream” or even the “European Dream.” These ideas are propagated through digital media, celebrity culture, and portrayals of affluent lifestyles in Western societies. In some cases, symbolic dimensions include problematic elements such as the sexualization of host populations<sup>87</sup> or ideological

“...PROBLEMATIC ELEMENTS SUCH AS THE SEXUALIZATION OF HOST POPULATIONS OR IDEOLOGICAL NARRATIVES OF REVERSING COLONIAL HIERARCHIES

narratives of reversing colonial hierarchies,<sup>88</sup> which may contribute to tensions and violence in destination countries.

This symbolic driver’s unconscious nature resists traditional forms of deterrence, such as border control or economic disincentives. Furthermore, as core destination countries within the European Union implement stricter immigration controls, smaller states like Hungary, despite lacking a “Hungarian dream” narrative, may increasingly become targets of these migration flows.

In sum, migration is driven by a complex interplay of material, symbolic, and mixed incentives. Once initiated, the presence and achievements of immigrants and their descendants act as powerful symbols, perpetuating chain migration and making this phenomenon challenging to halt.

### 2.1.2. Technology, social media, and novel pull-type causes of migration bound for Europe

*“Television, films, newspapers and the internet had vastly increased knowledge of other places in the world at the same time as global travel has become extraordinarily quick and cheap.”—Anthony Browne, Civitas, 2002<sup>89</sup>*

As technology advances, new possibilities emerge that actively reshape the motivational structure of potential migrants, pulling and nudging people to pack up their things and leave home for a new land. The most obvious example of this is social media. A 2024 quantitative study by Iranian researcher Zahra Aghaei Khaledi of Iranian aspirant migrants found that even after controlling for age, gender, and education, social media use (specifically Instagram) remained a powerful statistical predictor of migration intentions.<sup>90</sup> In the same study, more than **70% of respondents** agreed that social media provides a **positive image** of life abroad, contributing to a belief that migration would improve their quality of life. Over **60%** of the sample also reported that they had **seen content from Iranian migrants abroad**, which often included depictions of improved economic, social, or political conditions. The visibility of success stories created an “aspirational” narrative that **amplified migration intention**.<sup>91</sup>

**VISIBLE SUCCESS STORIES**   
**ON SOCIAL MEDIA AMPLIFY**  
**MIGRATION INTENTIONS**

The social media feeds of users in the Arab world are also replete with popular reels, videos, and images of Arab influencers enjoying European tourist destinations and other luxury settings.<sup>92</sup> Connecting this with the high proportion of sexual assaults committed by migrants in Europe relative to the native population, it is conceivable that 'sex appeal' may also play a part in the motivations of migrants to enter Europe. Supporting evidence for this exists only in the form of studies focusing on non-heterosexual migrants, whose experiences and motivations may not be representative of human movement in the broader global context. Nevertheless, such studies do reveal a connection between sexual preferences and desire to migrate to the European continent.<sup>93</sup> Tangentially, it is worth noting that the pornography industry (widely consumed in the origin countries of migrants coming from the global south) is itself a Western industry, and therefore that sexual ideas about Western women obtained through pornography exported from the West may play a role in the desire for migrants to come to the West in the first place.

But factors like internet pornography and social media cannot be fully blamed for fueling migration intentions, considering that none of these vectors would even exist without the internet itself. A more fundamental factor in the intention and desire for migration is indeed just this: internet access. In recent years, numerous quantitative research studies have demonstrated that internet access and the extension of its availability to previously internet-free areas is a significant driving factor of migration intentions (not only in the third

world but also globally).<sup>94</sup> This is simple to explain. Prior to the internet, there would be no way for subsistence agricultural laborers in, for example, rural and impoverished villages in Bangladesh to obtain such a direct and compelling vision of life in Europe or North America. With the internet now serving as the world's informatic common market, such farmers are not only able to visualize the dream of life after migration; they can also access resources and step-by-step instructions to make that dream a reality. To quote Anthony Browne of *Civitas* in the U.K.:

*“With travel so easy, and global wealth so imbalanced, there is now for the first time in history both the means and the motive for mass migration on a scale that the world has never seen before. One US study suggested that **400 million people in the world want to move to the US.** Such flows would seriously destabilise not just the destination countries—where the changes would be **permanent**—but also the countries of origin[...]*”<sup>95</sup>

With 90% of people aged six and over being projected to have internet access by 2030 (7.6 billion, compared to roughly 5.3 billion today),<sup>96</sup> migrant target countries are facing a historical turning point. With hundreds of millions more people joining the global internet, the digital pathways to migration (through messaging apps that allow encrypted access to smugglers,

**THE INTERNET ITSELF  
IS A FUNDAMENTAL  
DRIVER OF 21ST  
CENTURY MIGRATION  
INTENTIONS**



GPS services, migrant support groups, international banking and cryptocurrency apps that allow migrants to send money home) will become more powerful than ever before. These forecasts suggest that migration intentions are set to intensify in the coming years, making firm legal measures and policy stances essential for the future of migration-receiving countries.

## 2.2. Legal Attitudes to Migration and Current Prospects

*“The definition of law...is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.”—St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I–II, q. 90, a. 4.*

The legal frameworks which classify migrants and their cross-border movements as either lawful, or unlawful, are instantiated in international law, state legislation, and finally supranational law. In addition, they are also instantiated in bilateral or multi-lateral agreements that fall outside the scope of these three standard categories, a prominent example being the recent U.S.–Salvadorean compact that allows for the deportation of third-country nationals not holding citizenship in either state to be deported from the United States to El Salvador.<sup>97</sup>

With the exception of novel bilateral migration compacts, all the aforementioned categories of migration legislation have one thing in common: they are being challenged by populations around the world who feel the impact of migration in their respective countries, and desire to see things change. As discussed in the previous chapter, technology has become a powerful catalyst for a paradigm shift in the global movement of people—and U.N. conventions that were adopted half

a century prior to the advent of the smartphone are no longer universally accepted as fit for purpose in the way they once were. With this background, it is important to consider the landscape of legislative attitudes toward migration more broadly than from the Hungarian perspective alone. How things have changed, are changing, and where this change leads us is the critically important context for thought leaders and policymakers to consider. Our aim in this chapter is to be guided by the Christian virtue of prudence—looking carefully through the shifting attitudes in the U.S., the European Union, and in Hungary itself, to understand the context into which migration proposals that are ethical in the Christian worldview could be intelligently introduced.

### **2.2.1. Legal attitudes: the United States**

Legal postures toward migration in the United States have undergone dramatic change over the previous century; well before the passage of the 1965 Hart-Celler Immigration Act, U.S. positions were actively contested and debated internally. Nevertheless, this development of U.S. migration policy over time is rooted in foundational legal documents, going back as far as, and including, the Declaration of Independence itself. Early American acceptance criteria for migrants were explicitly exclusionary, being implemented on the basis of factors such as race, which are no longer accepted in international law. The

## 2.2. LEGAL ATTITUDES TO MIGRATION AND CURRENT PROSPECTS

aforementioned Immigration Act of 1965 amended this state of affairs, leaving the United States open to immigration from the entire world, on the basis of specific qualifying characteristics held by the migrants in question (as embodied in the H-1B visa application program, which has recently been restricted dramatically under the Trump Administration<sup>98</sup>).

Legally speaking, U.S. attitudes toward immigration have been rapidly evolving throughout the past decade. Following President Trump's first term (2016–2020) in which work began on a border wall blocking off illegal immigrants from crossing the U.S. border via Mexico, a strong reaction came from U.S. judges and bureaucrats, effectively blocking the proposed 'wall' that Trump campaigned on as an electoral promise.<sup>99</sup> Subsequently, during the Biden Administration from 2020–2024, illegal immigration surged—perhaps in large part due to the anticipation of free opportunity that came along with the repudiation of Trump's policy platform in the wake of his electoral defeat in 2020.<sup>100</sup> As a result, the number of illegal border crossings recorded surged dramatically.

As of 2025, the position of the United States and its government with respect to the legal regulation and control of migration policy has been completely transformed. Following President Trump's re-election to a second term in 2024, radical changes have been implemented in the normative legal domains of migrant admissions, and illegal immigrant removal (i.e., deportations). Why did U.S. migration policy change so dramatically, so fast? Beyond the unique persona of President Trump himself, there are several key factors which explain the

radical turnabout and its acceptance by the American political establishment.

Firstly, there are economic factors at hand—immigrants depress the wages of native workers, and when it comes to illegal immigrants, low-skilled workers are particularly vulnerable to this wage suppression.<sup>101</sup> Secondly, the presence of unidentified persons illegally entering and inhabiting U.S. territory is itself inherently a risk to national security; something President Trump emphasized repeatedly throughout his 2024 campaign.<sup>102</sup> Thirdly, the many years of news media critique and dialogic reaction to President Trump's anti-migration viewpoints had prepared Americans with a modicum of awareness toward the problems (crime, economics, and beyond) that illegal migration accompanied—an environment that consented to President Trump's declaration of a national emergency over the issue of migration once he resumed his executive role.<sup>103</sup> Like everyone else, Americans are uncomfortable with the prospect of unidentified illegal trespassers living in or close to their homes—particularly when the presence of such persons is connected to scandalous criminal allegations (i.e., gang activity, human trafficking, drug dealing, etc.).

What stands out most about America's current legal stance toward migration as of 2025 is President Trump's<sup>104</sup> hardline restrictive position on illegal border entry, and also his unprecedented enthusiasm for deporting apprehended illegal immigrants.<sup>105</sup> At the same time, the second Trump Administration has broken ground in another way, by outright rejecting entry to the United States for citizens of certain 'blacklisted' countries.<sup>106</sup>

## 2.2. LEGAL ATTITUDES TO MIGRATION AND CURRENT PROSPECTS

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Current U.S. protocol for country-wide entry bans cite irrefutable factual evidence as justification; i.e., the fact that banned countries “remain deficient with regards to screening and vetting.”<sup>107</sup> Political affiliation aside, practical reason dictates that war-torn countries such as Libya (included in the blacklist) lack the full capability to collect personal data and conduct background checks on citizens, as required by U.S. law for entry visa applications. The *status quo*, therefore, is less radical than it may seem.

More dramatic, however, is the new U.S. attitude toward asylum seekers and refugees. In June of 2025, SCOTUS ruled in favor of the Trump Administration’s proposal to deport asylum seekers to third countries, in which they did not have citizenship or familial ties.<sup>108</sup> This is not without precedent: Trump dramatically cut refugee admissions in his first administration, years ago.<sup>109</sup> What is unprecedented is the flurry of legal reforms that President Trump has introduced to the ‘irregular’ migration process (such as the ‘Remain in Mexico’ policy)<sup>110</sup> and the accompaniment of these reforms with a massive budgetary increase for ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) of \$75bn over the coming four years.<sup>111</sup> Simultaneously, the toleration of persons from certain countries being illegally present on American soil under Biden has been dramatically reversed—the obvious example being that of Haitian illegal migrants.<sup>112</sup> The DHS (Department of Homeland Security) spokesperson later defended this decision, noting that it: “restores integrity in our immigration system and ensures that Temporary Protected Status is actually

temporary.”<sup>113</sup> Finally, President Trump signed Executive Order (EO) 14160, denying access to citizenship by birthright for persons falling under the conditions specified in the EO.<sup>114</sup>

What stands out amidst the wave of unprecedented and sometimes erratic policy changes is the shifting target of these policies: not only illegal migrants but also legal migrants are affected by the Trump Administration’s executive actions. An example can be seen in the aforementioned travel restrictions for certain blacklisted countries.<sup>115</sup> Another recent executive change affecting legal immigrants is the \$15,000 payment required as a visa bond for traveler applicants from Zambia and Malawi, ostensibly aiming to rein in visa overstays.<sup>116</sup> The dollar payment is to be automatically returned after a specific period of time, unless conditions of acceptance are violated.<sup>117</sup>

Why have American attitudes toward migration and migrants changed so dramatically in the past few years alone? One fundamental factor is the massive number of illegal migrants estimated to be living on U.S. territory (in 2023 the figure was 47.8 million, in 2024 it rose to 51.6 million, this higher figure represents 15.6% of the total U.S. population).<sup>118</sup> From an ecumenical Christian point of view, this concern is entirely legitimate. While humanitarian considerations remain, properly ordered charity which begins with duties to one’s own nation provides the ethical and transcendent foundation for any just migration policy. Christian tradition affirms that love must be guided by justice and moral clarity, and only then will the policymakers make regulations that reflect fairness in legal procedures and promotes common good.

In conclusion, the U.S. is experiencing radical changes in its legal attitudes and governance stance toward migration—legal and illegal. The stated goals of these changes are the strengthening of the existing cultural heritage and social bonds of the American nation.

### **2.2.2. Legal attitudes: the European Union**

The European Union as a political entity is deeply informed by post-WWII moral philosophy. After 1945, pan-European institutions and legal documents drew inspiration from both natural law theorists and positivists, thus attempting to balance what Hans Kelsen referred to as ‘pure law’ on the one hand,<sup>119</sup> and ‘Christian ethics’<sup>120</sup> on the other. A third element equally inherent in EU law and jurisprudence is Enlightenment humanism,<sup>121</sup> characterized by an ethical emphasis on caring for the vulnerable, as well as upholding the inherent dignity of all human beings. Fundamentally, these principles form the normative self-understanding of the European Union, from its inception to the present day. How the EU reacts to, and deals with, the migration phenomenon is heavily influenced by the binding legal frameworks and philosophical traditions in which it is grounded as a supranational institution.

The basic legal instruments that regulate the external borders of the European Union are the Schengen Borders Code<sup>122</sup> and Visa Code,<sup>123</sup> and the 2020 New Pact on Migration

and Asylum.<sup>124</sup> This latter addition seeks to establish a balance between responsibility and solidarity through four pillars;<sup>125</sup> (1) securing external borders; (2) granting fast procedures; (3) establishing an effective system of solidarity and responsibility; (4) embedding migration in internal partnerships.<sup>126</sup> Migration procedures within the EU from third-country applicants or entrants are therefore governed legally by primary and secondary EU law, with a notable distinction between asylum seekers, legal migrants, and irregular entrants recognized in statute. The *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*,<sup>127</sup> under Articles 77–80, provides the legal framework for a

“ AFTER THE 2015 MIGRATION  
CRISIS, WHICH SHOOK THE  
DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL  
NORMS OF THE ENTIRE CONTINENT,

common immigration and asylum policy founded on solidarity and fair sharing among EU Member States. This is accompanied

by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,<sup>128</sup> with its enshrined principles on the right to asylum,<sup>129</sup> prohibition of refoulement (non-refoulement principle)<sup>130</sup> and respect for human dignity.<sup>131</sup>

Key instruments in the Common European Asylum System,<sup>132</sup> including the Dublin III Regulation<sup>133</sup> and the Asylum Procedures Directive,<sup>134</sup> strive for harmonization of asylum processes across Member States. **After the 2015 migration crisis, which shook the demographic and political norms of the entire continent,** it became clear that the asylum system in the EU did not ensure a uniform and efficient procedure. Due to this recognition, in 2016 there was a proposal

for a new Asylum Procedure Regulation,<sup>135</sup> that aimed to establish a more efficient asylum application procedure and prevent secondary movements, where asylum seekers move from one state to another.

Broadly speaking, communitarian thinking<sup>136</sup> emphasizes the community's tradition as a primary aspect of the individuals belonging to said community (i.e., the freedom of individual Christians, belonging to a religious community, to practice their faith in communion with their fellow believers), as well as the right of states to exercise final authority over their borders (in support of collective cultural self-determination).<sup>137</sup> The "states may recognize special obligations to admit would-be immigrants (especially those in need) who have some historical, national connection to the state"<sup>138</sup> but "group's have a right to control immigration because this is required for control over the groups' character, and such control is an important part of self-determination."<sup>139</sup> Such arguments are central to political debates, such as in the context of increased migration flows, underpinning the securitization of migration and externalization of EU border control by partnership agreements with third countries. **The dialectics of individualism-communitarianism, and of liberalism-conservatism are reflected in law as moral imperative and in the practical approach of state laws, thus generating tension.**<sup>140</sup>

GROUP'S HAVE   
A RIGHT TO CONTROL  
IMMIGRATION BECAUSE  
THIS IS REQUIRED FOR  
CONTROL OVER THE  
GROUP'S CHARACTER

This tension comes from the neglect of the Christian social teaching of subsidiarity, which is discussed in Part 1 of this white paper. Subsidiarity means that decisions should be made at the level closest to those affected, because it is impossible to promote the dignity of the person without showing concern for those in need within our reach. With subsidiarity as an axiom of policy, we can better ensure that both accountability as well as justice are realized in legal outcomes.<sup>141</sup>

In this line of legal thought, we may argue that the state is not only entitled to give priority to the protection and cultural identity of its citizens, but is indeed obligated to do so. Of

“ WITH SUBSIDIARITY  
AS AN AXIOM OF POLICY...  
ACCOUNTABILITY AS WELL  
AS JUSTICE ARE REALIZED

course, such an approach (like any other) ultimately results in real-world legal consequences. One example of such thinking and such consequences can be found in the criminal courts of France, which in

2024 handed a Tunisian migrant a deportation order after he publicly made antisemitic and misogynistic statements.<sup>142</sup> The court stated that these statements violated French republican values and public order, not only on legal grounds, but on moral grounds as well.

In 2025, several EU member states were reported as “ramping up [their] migration crackdown with new proposals to fast-track deportations and set up controversial return hubs outside its borders.”<sup>143</sup> In March 2025 the European Commission proposed a common set of stricter rules for deportation of illegal migrants.<sup>144</sup> The main obstacle to the

successful implementation of such reforms is that the EU, under current legislative frameworks, can only deport rejected asylum seekers back to their country of origin or a country they transited from, unless they agree otherwise.<sup>145</sup>

Although there is a restrictive tendency in many EU member states, there are still countries that are fined if they implement stricter policies. In 2024, the EU's top court "fined Hungary €200m (£169m) for failing to follow the union's asylum policies. The court will also issue a penalty of €1m a day until it changes its policy."<sup>146</sup> In mid-April 2025 the total amount reached €512 million.<sup>147</sup>

Migration policy and legislation is a sensitive topic in the EU, and in the past few years this sensitivity has become a target for exploitation by political parties seeking popular support and electoral gains.<sup>148</sup> At the same time, there are legitimate reasons that parties and states increasingly call for concern on the issue of migration. Uniformly, EU member states' asylum systems are overburdened, lacking the resources and the **capacity to cope with the huge numbers of applicants**.<sup>149</sup> This does not even take into account the problems of migration-related demographic shifts, which are also politically sensitive and inflammatory in some EU countries.<sup>150</sup> Overall, the recent trend toward more restrictive immigration procedures in EU law and in the law of its member states is evidently a product of pragmatism and political realism, rather than a fruit of racist or ethnic exclusionary ideologies.

The ways in which immigration is legally restricted and revised vary within the EU, from one member state to another.

Some concrete examples include Italy's enforcement of a naval blockade on migrant boats,<sup>151</sup> and Germany's new measures to fast-track deportation for rejected asylum seekers and novel border controls.<sup>152</sup> France intends to limit visa acceptance for states refusing to repatriate expelled migrants.<sup>153</sup> Poland continues to emphasize the 'Christian only' solidarity policy as a cornerstone of its migration law, heavily focusing on those in need of refugee status, such as persecuted Christians (an option that we address in our proposal section).<sup>154</sup> As in the U.S., the EU also has a 'safe third country' concept that allows states to reject an asylum application as inadmissible when it is deemed that an applicant could have sought international protection in a third country.<sup>155</sup> Previously, these legal principles were effectively ignored and many states abjured their right to invoke them (most explicitly showcased by Germany under Angela Merkel in 2015). As of 2025, it looks like that period of legal indulgence is almost over.

According to data from Eurostat, 123,905 third-country nationals were ordered to leave the territory of an EU country in the first quarter of 2025. This constitutes a decrease by 0.9% in comparison with the previous quarter, but an increase of 18.4% when compared to the same period in 2024. Overall, just three EU countries (France, Germany, and Spain) accounted for more than half (55.8%) of all third-country nationals ordered to leave during Q1 of 2025.<sup>156</sup> These numbers show definitive change in the legal attitudes toward migration within the European Union. Despite the apparent shift in electoral and political will, the European Court of

Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) continue to uphold the liberal interpretation of the law, thus “rendering it nearly impossible for member states to take effective action against illegal migration.”<sup>157</sup>

### 2.2.3. Legal attitudes: Hungary

Hungary’s legal attitude to migration is fundamentally shaped by its historical experiences, cultural traditions, and constitutional identity as a Christian nation. Moreover, Hungary’s present legal stance is also heavily influenced by the Orbán government’s 15-year rule, which facilitated the enactment in law of the current Hungarian Constitution, which remains in force to this day.<sup>158</sup> Unlike the individualistic-communitarian dialectic present in many Western legal systems, Hungary positions itself explicitly as upholding a communitarian legal ethic, prioritizing the people over the individual, when a distinction between the two is necessitated. This approach prioritizes national sovereignty, cultural cohesion, and the protection of the collective well-being of Hungarians (in social, economic, and legal terms) over abstract universalist norms.

The Fundamental Law, which serves as the foundation of Hungary’s legal system, deliberately departs from the Soviet-style constitution of 1949. Its passage in 2011 was consciously intended to bring closure to the turbulent 20<sup>th</sup> century and the unstable transition period that followed the collapse of communism in the 1990s. The Preamble of the Fundamental

Law, known as the ‘**National Avowal**,’ explicitly declares Hungary’s Christian roots,<sup>159</sup> the importance of family and nation, and the duty of the state to preserve the constitutional identity and Christian heritage of the country. It states:

“We believe that our national culture is a rich contribution to the diversity of European unity. We respect the freedom and culture of other nations, and strive to cooperate with all nations of the world. [...] *We hold that individual freedom can only be complete in cooperation with others.*”<sup>160</sup>

And:

“The protection of the constitutional identity and *Christian culture of Hungary shall be an obligation of every organ of the State. In order to protect constitutional identity, an independent organ established by a cardinal Act shall operate.*”<sup>161</sup>

This constitutional commitment provides the normative foundation for Hungary’s migration policy. The Hungarian government has consistently maintained that **migration (especially illegal, uncontrolled migration) poses a potential threat to the nation’s security, cultural integrity, and social order.**<sup>162</sup> Consequently, migration is not perceived just as a humanitarian or economic issue, but as a question of national survival and identity preservation.

One of the central elements of Hungary’s legal attitude is the **constitutional identity clause** introduced via **Article E(2)**<sup>163</sup> of the Fundamental Law, which states that Hungary

shall participate in the European Union's integration process, while preserving its constitutional identity rooted in its historical constitution. In practice, this means that any supranational legal obligation that contradicts Hungary's national identity, security, or public order can be challenged.

The Hungarian Constitutional Court confirmed this principle in its 2016 Decision 22 (XII. 5.),<sup>164</sup> declaring that **Hungary's constitutional identity cannot be disregarded even when this conflicts with EU obligations,**<sup>165</sup> particularly in sensitive areas such as migration policy. The Court in its decision states that the protection of national sovereignty, society's security, and the preservation of constitutional identity are legitimate aims that can justify restrictions on migration.

**THE UNCONTROLLED ADMISSION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF MIGRANTS THREATENS THE SURVIVAL OF EUROPE'S CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS, AND SOCIAL ORDER** »»

The Orbán government has repeatedly argued that Hungary's moral responsibility stands first and foremost toward Hungary's own people, their security, their cultural heritage, and their ability to enjoy the benefits of a harmonious and cohesive society.<sup>166</sup> While the government acknowledges the humanitarian plight of refugees, it maintains that **the uncontrolled admission of large numbers of migrants would threaten the survival of Europe's and Hungary's cultural, religious, and social order.**<sup>167</sup>

Hungarian migration law has changed since the 2015 migration crisis. The government declared a 'state of crisis due

to mass immigration,' and constructed a border fence along its southern border with Serbia (which is also a border for the Schengen Zone) and passed several amendments tightening asylum laws.<sup>168</sup> The legal framework was adapted to ensure that Hungary has full control over who can enter and stay within the country's territory. The **Asylum Act** was amended to create **transit zones** where asylum seekers were obliged to wait while their applications were processed. Although these zones were later closed due to a ruling by the European Court of Justice, the government continues to operate a **restrictive and security-centered asylum policy**. The number of asylum

## 407,364 RESIDENCE PERMIT APPROVALS IN 2024

seekers in 2015 was over 170,000, which collapsed to a count of just 29 by 2024.<sup>169</sup> On the other hand, following the outbreak of the war between Ukraine and Russia in 2022 an unprecedented humanitarian aid operation was launched to support those fleeing the devastating conflict in the neighboring country. Many refugees arrived from the Transcarpathian region, which has a significant Hungarian population.<sup>170</sup>

In February of 2025, Hungary's National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing gave statistical reports indicating a slight increase of residence permit approvals (totaling 407,364 approvals in 2024, compared to 4,000 fewer in the previous year of 2023).<sup>171</sup> Unlike asylum, the possibility of work-related immigration from a third country to the EU is not a fundamental human right, thus allowing it to fall within the discretionary powers of the member states.

This communitarian attitude has often placed Hungary at odds with **EU migration policies**, as is explicit in the case of the **EU quota system regulating redistribution of asylum seekers among member states**.<sup>172</sup> Hungary, along with some other Central European states, refused to implement the relocation protocols, arguing that such **resettlement violates its national sovereignty and disregards the will of the Hungarian people**.<sup>173</sup>

To summarize, Hungary is an EU member state in which the law takes into consideration abstract yet fundamentally important principles, such as national sovereignty, cultural cohesion, and constitutionally-defined identity. As of 2025, under the current Orbán government, Hungary is well-positioned to defend its right to control migration as an essential element of exercising its sovereignty. It also defends the right of its indigenous citizens to have and maintain a homeland of their own, opposing measures and laws which would allow Hungary's future to be determined by waves of migrants—legal or illegal—who do not accept Christian values or the values embodied in Hungary's constitution. Fundamentally, Hungary's relationship with the mass migration phenomenon is largely consolidated in law and governance norms, and renegotiating that relationship can only come about through the democratic will of the electorate.

**AS OF 2025... HUNGARY  
IS WELL-POSITIONED  
TO DEFEND ITS RIGHT  
TO CONTROL MIGRATION** ””

## 2.3. Impacts of Migration on Host Economies

There is a broad consensus on the positive economic impact of migration on host communities—at least within academia. Extreme pro-migration arguments can be found in publications and books such as *Open Borders: The Science and Ethics of Immigration* by Bryan Caplan and Zach Weinersmith, who argue that a world of borderless movement could bring about unprecedented socioeconomic flourishing.<sup>174</sup> Acknowledging this discourse, De Haas et al. note: “it is often claimed that labor migration from poor to rich countries meets mutual needs.”<sup>175</sup> The arrival of low-skilled workers ready to fill the gaps in ‘3D (dirty, difficult and dangerous) jobs’ in developed countries seems a win-win situation: citizens of poor countries can increase their salaries and improve living conditions, while local people can concentrate on more skilled and value-added jobs. In the case of highly qualified employees, the benefits for both the worker and the employer are more evident: salaries of doctors or IT specialists in the developed world are many times bigger than in the developing one, while it seems as though there is always a shortage of highly skilled labor in Europe and North-America (the flaws in this viewpoint are discussed in Chapter 1.12.). Nevertheless, this pro-migration, pro-open borders discourse conspicuously lacks recognition of

the ways in which economic migration is often exploitative and harmful to workers (both local and immigrants), the host economies into which they enter, and the origin economies from which they exit.

Detailed analyses highlight the fact that businesses and higher income groups benefit the most from low-skilled force migration, while blue-collar local workers risk the loss of their jobs, and more regularly suffer from wage depression due to their reduced bargaining power as workers.<sup>176</sup> In the meantime, the power of trade unions to protect the rights and well-being of host country citizens is jeopardized by the importation of cheap employees who have lower standards for working and living conditions—a fact empirically verified by Peter Turchin, as well as many other prominent academic leaders in demography and economics.<sup>177</sup> Alarmingl

**the institutional hollowing-out**

**of trade unions through mass immigration is often an intentional goal**, rather than an unintended externality, of the importation of migrant labor. In an article entitled “Immigrants Keep the United States Free by Undermining Labor Unions,” Cato Institute libertarian thinker Alex Nowrasteh excitedly notes that “*the unionization rate and stock of immigrants are strongly negatively correlated.*”<sup>178</sup> Nowrasteh continues, providing evidence from subsequent analyses indicating that a causal relationship underlies this correlation,

”  
**THE INSTITUTIONAL  
HOLLOWING-OUT  
OF TRADE UNIONS  
THROUGH MASS  
IMMIGRATION IS OFTEN  
AN INTENTIONAL GOAL**

noting: “Immigrants can explain about 30 percent of the decline in union density during 1994–2020.”<sup>179</sup>

The hollowing out of trade unions is equally detrimental for migrant workers as it is for the native workforce. From a Christian perspective, their decline represents not only the weakening of a sociopolitically relevant organizational force capable of negotiating with both big business and political authorities on behalf of workers’ rights and just compensation, but also the erosion of a vital instrument of solidarity and justice. More specifically, in Catholic Social Teaching, unions are an indispensable element of social life, the embodiment of fraternity in the productive life of nations, and promoters of social justice in order to achieve and sustain the common good.<sup>180</sup>

In such sense, the collapse of unions entails deteriorating socioeconomic conditions for the workers, and elevated profit margins for the capital-holding classes. As an example, African-American low-skilled workers, who held a central place in the U.S. economy for most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, were heavily affected by the influx of migrant labor that entered the United States after the 1965 Hart-Celler Immigration Act; employers naturally prefer vulnerable immigrants who accept lower salaries over unionized African-Americans who might agitate for higher wages.<sup>181</sup> A Brookings report authored in 1997 by Borjas et al. (Harvard University) puts it simply: “Immigration has had a marked adverse impact on the economic status of the least skilled U.S. workers (high school dropouts and those in the bottom 20 percent of the wage distribution.”<sup>182</sup>

Empirical studies also question the economic benefits of labor migration for host countries, highlighting the fiscal burden it imposes on state budgets. In their book, Jan H. van de Beek and his co-authors examined the welfare expenditures of the Dutch state for migrants and the income tax that foreigners paid to the budget between 1995 and 2019, and found that the Netherlands spent a net €400bn on migrants—an extreme sum, even in comparison to neighboring countries with generous welfare state systems.<sup>183</sup> Although the welfare system of the United States is less developed than most European ones, a recent study estimated that “net lifetime fiscal impact (taxes paid minus costs) of immigrants by education indicates that the fiscal drain created by the average illegal immigrant is \$68,000.”<sup>184</sup> **This means that local taxpayers’ money is used to cover the cost of social benefits paid over the lifetime to low-skilled immigrant workers.**

**LOCAL TAXPAYERS’ MONEY  
IS USED TO COVER THE  
COST OF SOCIAL BENEFITS  
PAID OVER THE LIFETIME  
TO LOW-SKILLED  
IMMIGRANT WORKERS** ”

More broadly, the phenomenon of massive migration into urban areas (along with the concomitant residential overcrowding etc.) carries demographic implications as well. Housing, income and security are key issues when starting a family<sup>185</sup>—and through its impact upon these metrics, it follows that mass migration itself may suppress birth rates among local populations living in high migration areas (an

effect which may be statistically concealed by the typically higher birth rates exhibited by arriving immigrants).

The arrival of educated laborers evokes ethical dilemmas about the countries of origin of immigrants as well, since this is a typical form of ‘brain drain’ which siphons off the most talented and entrepreneurially minded people of third-world countries who would be essential for local development and economic growth.<sup>186</sup> In 2014, Iranian finance minister Reza Faraji-Dana estimated that brain drain was costing Iran

\$150bn per year, due to high rates of emigration among highly educated and talented human capital.<sup>187</sup> This economic loss stunts economic growth and prospects for development in migration-source countries,

potentially creating a ‘migration trap’ where the **worsened economic situation which incentivizes more citizens to emigrate in the future.**

“**WORSENERD ECONOMIC  
SITUATION WHICH  
INCENTIVIZES MORE  
CITIZENS TO EMIGRATE  
IN THE FUTURE**”

The findings do not mean that nobody wins from migration: certain actors, such as big companies, benefit from the reduced employment costs of low-skilled migrant workers.<sup>188</sup> Of course, migrants in Europe themselves also benefit from the process, and from the improved living standards that they experience upon arrival.<sup>189</sup> Nevertheless, the collective cost/benefit analysis for host societies must take into account the crippling cost that mass migration can exact upon state budgets. Germany, at present, constitutes an extreme example of this, with welfare

costs skyrocketing above €40bn per year (approximately half of all recipients being first-generation migrants).<sup>190</sup>

Ultimately though, if local taxpayers shoulder the burden of social expenditure for subsidizing new migrant arrivals, and simultaneously face greater competition in the labor market as well as stagnant wage growth due to the excess labor supply, then the ‘economic benefits’ of mass migration may translate into economic immiseration for native citizens in host countries.

In conclusion, a Christian economic perspective considers unemployment, wage depression, exploitation of immigrants, the collapse of trade unions, unjust fiscal burdens, and brain drain as not merely economic difficulties but moral injustices. A political-economic system that benefits from massive and sometimes even illegal immigration, provoking the appearance of such phenomena, is a system that denies human dignity by treating workers as expendable objects, erodes solidarity, and undermines the common good by impoverishing whole communities.

### **2.3.1. Practical factors: Hungarian ‘Gastarbeiters’ and new regulatory frameworks**

Despite Hungary’s strict regulations on immigration, it has a legal framework for accepting ‘Gastarbeiters,’ offering short-term work permits to shore up workforce capacity gaps in necessary industries or sectors. The reason for the existence

of such arrangements is quite simple: Hungary is suffering from an aging and declining population, which is why one of the government's main objectives is to encourage family formation and childbearing.<sup>191</sup> Practically speaking, however, bolstering the country's lagging birthrates cannot conceivably fix a deficit in the supply of labor that businesses are experiencing today, or might indeed experience a month from now.

As of January 1<sup>st</sup> 2025, the regulatory framework for Gastarbeiter acceptance has been radically reformed.<sup>192</sup> Previously (before December 31, 2024), Gastarbeiter work and residence permits were only eligible for citizens of specific countries: the Philippines, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Vietnam, Brazil, Georgia, Colombia, Venezuela, and Kyrgyzstan. The jobs for which these workers could legally be hired were also tied to specific FEOR codes,<sup>193</sup> allowing the government oversight over the supply *and* demand for such visas based on economic analysis of legitimate need within each economic sector.

As of now, this framework has been dramatically overhauled. The main modification is the limitation of eligible nationalities for such permits. From the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2025, **only citizens of Georgia and Armenia** can be employed in Hungary under either a guest worker or employment-related residence permit. On the 10<sup>th</sup> of January 2025, the **Philippines** was added to the list.<sup>194</sup> Only short-term classical Gastarbeiter positions (consisting of less than six months of work) are restricted to these three countries; in other words, the rules do not apply for permanent working arrangements, which follow a different regulatory framework.

The decree that brought this change into law is motivated by legitimate concerns held by the Hungarian government and its electorate. One primary concern is Hungary's national and social cohesion, which could foreseeably suffer if business owners, particularly in the farming and manufacturing sectors, were able to replace domestic workers with entirely foreign staff on lower wages for higher profit margins (something explicitly addressed in the decree in the context of stricter controls introduced for Gastarbeiters in the low-skilled category). Another concern was legal certainty and the guarantee of repatriability (e.g., ensuring the lack of obstacles that could prevent forcible repatriation, when legally required). This is a shift in Hungarian policy toward a more selective and controlled framework for accepting foreign labor.<sup>195</sup>

ONE PRIMARY CONCERN IS HUNGARY'S NATIONAL AND SOCIAL COHESION

### 2.3.2. Migration and the Hungarian economy

Migrant labor plays an active role in the Hungarian economy, increasingly drawing in human capital for economic activity from outside of continental Europe. In 2023, 37,720 Asian immigrants arrived in Hungary, while only 19,039 Europeans came. More than half of the 61,347 immigrants arriving in Hungary are of Asian descent, and until 2017, the number of immigrants arriving annually had not exceeded

37,000. 2023 is the first year when Europe ceased to be in first place as the continent of origin for immigrants arriving in Hungary.<sup>196</sup> In 2024, 100,818 foreign nationals were staying in Hungary for employment purposes, 27,031 for family reunification, 35,867 for studies, 37,175 for resettlement, 7,531 for international protection, and 42,490 for other and unknown purposes.<sup>197</sup>

In Hungary, a significant number of Asian migrant workers are engaged in low-skilled, low-value-adding, mass-market jobs. They often work in assembly plants, they reside in extremely high-density housing units packed tightly with fellow migrants, and their recruitment and employment are

“MIGRANT LABOR INITIATIVES CAN CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC TENSIONS

highly regulated. Through the internet, the Hungarian general public has some visual exposure to these conditions, which are widely seen as undignified and economically exploitative by both sides. As the instigators of these arrangements are generally not identified by face or name in media reports

that address the visible presence of economic migrants, the only group toward which the public can effectively point the finger of blame and condemnation is that of the migrants themselves—as such, migrant labor initiatives are *de facto* a very real and unfortunate contributor to social and demographic tensions.<sup>198</sup>

Foreign students are of particular importance, as they also play an active and growing role in the Hungarian economy.<sup>199</sup>

A 2023 report states that international students make up approximately 15% of the Hungarian student body.<sup>200</sup> While admitting foreign students at higher fee brackets to collect money to re-invest in growth has proved to be a viable strategy for Western universities, it is difficult to determine how well this plan is working in practice for the Hungarian universities that are embracing it. Serious concerns emerged in 2023 with the publication of an investigation by the Hungarian news outlet *Index* that ran with the headline: *“10-20 percent of foreign university students apply to Hungarian universities only to be able to move to Western Europe after six months.”* This highlights an unresolved concern pertaining to the migration intentions of students admitted to Hungarian academic programs.<sup>201</sup>

In 2024, 250,912 foreign citizens resided in Hungary, according to data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office,<sup>202</sup> representing an increase of over 100,000 people compared to 2015. The number of nationals from Asia and Africa in particular is growing rapidly. In 2015, there were only 4,985 people from Africa and 33,868 from Asia in Hungary, and in 2024 there were 10,597 from Africa and 92,644 from Asia.<sup>203</sup> Not all foreign residents are economic migrants—but a large proportion are admitted for work or studies, and then find means to persist long after the expiration of the opportunity for which they were legally admitted.

### Foreign citizens residing in Hungary by nationality




Figure 3: Foreign citizens residing in Hungary by nationality<sup>204</sup>

In conclusion, migration has become a growing factor in the Hungarian national economy—one whose prevalence is likely to increase in coming years. **The legal frameworks determining the permitted period of stay for migrants<sup>205</sup> are particularly important for Hungary’s demographic future:** the longer that ostensibly temporary categories of economic migrant (i.e., Gastarbeiters, foreign students) are able to legally reside in Hungary, or extend their stay here, the higher the likelihood of these visitors ‘changing their intentions’ (as discussed in Chapter 1.11.) and opting to seek permanent settlement in Hungary, or absconding to another country in the Schengen Zone.<sup>206</sup> Such decisions may be (and indeed often are) made irrespective of legality, and irrespective of promises made years prior to the expiry date of a legal work permit or student visa.

THE LEGAL   
FRAMEWORKS  
DETERMINING  
THE PERMITTED  
PERIOD OF STAY  
FOR MIGRANTS

In sum, economic migration is never just economic, as explained in Chapter 1.12. Yet it does play a part in Hungary’s economy and economic development goals, which is likely to persist throughout the foreseeable future due to demographic challenges that are beyond the scope of ‘quick fixes.’<sup>207</sup> While foreign workers do have a part to play in Hungary’s economic present and future, it is imperative that the mistake made by Germany over the past decade in its ‘**refugees as future German workers**’ paradigm be avoided, and Hungarian law is explicitly clear that migrant workers should be qualified and from culturally and religiously compatible countries if they are to be accepted (e.g., Georgia and Armenia).

With that said and done, the bottom line is this: the Hungarian political establishment and economic elite must ensure that migration of this form serves the nation and preserves its Christian values. It must never be allowed to compromise the welfare, well-being, and economic mobility of Hungarian communities, especially in relatively deprived rural areas desperate for economic opportunity in the form of factory and agricultural employment. Lastly, temporary

“ TEMPORARY LABOR NEEDS  
MUST NEVER BECOME AN  
EXCUSE FOR... PERMANENT  
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

labor needs must never become an excuse for large-scale settlement of foreign nationals that brings about permanent demographic change in the country's

composition. As Prime Minister Orbán alluded to in a speech from 2015, migration of *that* kind—as seen in certain other European countries—‘should not be seen as having any benefits.’<sup>208</sup>

A clear and just immigration policy is essential for the economy, as it is the duty of the host nation to regulate immigration in ways that safeguard both the dignity of immigrants and the stability of the native workforce, balancing this way the obligation to protect the own nation's citizens with the responsibilities owed to newcomers.

## 2.4. Migration, Security, and Crime

*“Salus populi suprema lex esto.” (“The health of the people is the supreme law.”)—Cicero, De Legibus, 52 BC.<sup>209</sup>*

The nexus between immigration and security, including public safety and terrorism, is a highly sensitive and contested issue. It is understandable if we consider that this topic is perhaps the most effective tool in the hands of anti-immigration radical groups to demonize migrants. Yet, the neglect or denial of the phenomenon is just fueling racist sentiment and stoking tension between host communities and new arrivals. Although the percentage of immigrants connected to terrorism and crime is small, terrorist attacks in Western Europe and the rapid expansion of certain violent clans and gangs<sup>210</sup> in Europe and the U.S. show the security risks of uncontrolled mass immigration.

The fundamental problem is that even the mainstream academic conceptualization of the migration–security nexus is based on denial. For instance, contemporary studies on security within political science have conceptualized the connection between immigration and crime rates (which is based on statistical analyses) as merely *securitizing* the phenomenon. This concept, *securitization*, refers to the supposed process by which states label certain issues as security threats

only to display their military power and domestic force on civilians. In this sense, securitization of migration in scholarly literature refers to the idea that migration is not a security issue, and that treating it as such identifies one as having an authoritarian agenda.

As an example of this thinking, De Haas et al. (2020) argue that, “in the absence of a real threat, politicians are tempted to manufacture an imaginary threat. [...] Demonizing the migrant as a potential ‘terrorist’ creates fear and a perception of threat to ontological security far exceeding actual developments.”<sup>211</sup> Yet, the recent wave of terrorist attacks in Europe committed by perpetrators with immigrant background cannot be considered a mere ‘securitization’ of an ‘absent’ problem.

### **2.4.1. Crime and social impact in migration-receiving countries**

Between 2011 and 2018, at least 140 refugees and migrants arrived in Europe who later committed or tried to organize terrorist attacks.<sup>212</sup> Between 2014–2018, of 104 migrant terrorists identified in Europe by authorities, “28 successfully completed attacks that claimed the lives of 170 victims and wounded 878. An additional 37 were arrested or killed plotting attacks, and 39 others were arrested for illegal involvement with foreign terrorist organizations.”<sup>213</sup> One source notes that while there were only 100 Jihadi suspects in Germany in 2014, their numbers increased to 1,600 by 2017; a number of these

being ‘ *sleeper cells* ’ that are sent into the country from Syria.<sup>214</sup> It is a  *naïve*  assumption that security services can perfectly vet hundreds of thousands of **irregular migrants** annually without a single mistake. This is why **irregular mass migration** is a **security threat** as well as an **ethical hazard *per se***.

In European countries, the consequences of this threat are increasingly undeniable. In countries like Sweden, migrant-origin criminal networks challenge state authority and jeopardize the credibility of local police and governments, significantly damaging the perception of safety among local citizens.<sup>215</sup> **In Sweden, according to 2017 data, 58% of all well-founded suspects of crimes are migrants.** In the case of robbery, this rate is 70%, and in the case of attempted murder, homicide and murder, this rate is 73%. About 13% of all crimes are linked to unregistered migrants. This demographic—which is relatively small in Sweden<sup>216</sup>—is dramatically overrepresented in criminal behavior.<sup>217</sup>

IRREGULAR MASS  
MIGRATION IS A  
SECURITY THREAT

According to data from the Migration Research Institute, **in 2022, foreigners without dual citizenship made up less than 8% of France’s population, but 25% of all prison inmates.**<sup>218</sup> In criminal convictions, this demographic is responsible for 31% of all violent thefts without weapons, and 38% of all burglaries.<sup>219</sup> Such wild disparities in crime rates between natives and foreigners are also found in the U.K., where between 2021 and 2023, “foreign nationals were convicted for sexual offences [at] a rate 71% higher than that of

the British population, 69% for drug-related crime, 25% for theft, and at 39% for all crime types.”<sup>220</sup> Again, in the U.K., **Christians who convert from Islam are often targeted by Muslims because of the death penalty for apostasy mandated by Islamic law (*shari’ah*).**<sup>221</sup> A recent example can be seen in **the attempted murder of Iranian Christian convert Javed Nouri**, which took place in Hartlepool in 2023. Nouri (a Christian refugee who attended church near the migrant hostel where he resided) was stabbed and severely wounded by a fellow asylum seeker living in the same hostel; when Nouri fought back, the attacker, **Moroccan Muslim Ahmed Alid**, left the hostel and stabbed to death a 70-year-old English pedestrian who happened to be close by.<sup>222</sup> In recorded statements, Alid defended his actions, stating that **Christian convert Nouri “deserved to die”** for confessing Christ.<sup>223</sup>

In the United States, during the fiscal year of 2024 alone, federal agents arrested a total of 49,000 alien individuals with criminal convictions or those wanted by law enforcement. In addition, 523 people with gang affiliations and 516 individuals were encountered in screening sets by Customs and Border Protection officers.<sup>224</sup> These numbers contain only immigrants who were captured *and* identified as having criminal or terrorism backgrounds: many more may have infiltrated the U.S. without detection. If estimated counts of resident border violators are correct, they represent only 1.7% of illegal aliens who entered the country. But we cannot in good conscience state that it does not pose a threat to the safety of the citizens of the U.S.<sup>225</sup>

**Total conviction rate (per 10,000)**

|    | Nationality        | Rate          | > greater than UK |
|----|--------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| 1  | <b>Albania</b>     | 4027.89       | 29.58             |
| 2  | <b>Moldova</b>     | 1662.50       | 12.21             |
| 3  | <b>Congo</b>       | 1583.33       | 11.63             |
| 4  | <b>Namibia</b>     | 1530.00       | 11.24             |
| 5  | <b>Somalia</b>     | 1096.67       | 8.05              |
| 6  | <b>Afghanistan</b> | 1023.08       | 7.51              |
| 7  | <b>Morocco</b>     | 984.00        | 7.23              |
| 8  | <b>Iraq</b>        | 930.00        | 6.83              |
| 9  | <b>Algeria</b>     | 845.83        | 6.21              |
| 10 | <b>Angola</b>      | 705.00        | 5.18              |
| 11 | <b>Gambia</b>      | 694.00        | 5.10              |
| 12 | <b>Eritrea</b>     | 687.27        | 5.05              |
| 13 | <b>Vietnam</b>     | 676.00        | 4.96              |
| 14 | <b>Tunisia</b>     | 620.00        | 4.55              |
| 15 | <b>Libya</b>       | 602.00        | 4.42              |
|    | <b>UK</b>          | <b>136.00</b> |                   |

Figure 4: U.K. criminal convictions handed down between 2021–2023, by nationality per 10,000 persons<sup>226</sup>

Between 2013 and 2023, the incidence of recorded sexual violence crimes increased by 79% across the European Union. It is worth noting that the impact of this trend is disproportionately heavy in countries popular with migrants, such as Italy, Germany, and France. From 2022 to 2023, this category of crime grew by a steady 7%.<sup>227</sup> In the United States, by contrast, 2023 saw the estimated number of offenses in the rape category fall by 9.4% in comparison with 2022.

How concerned are you about the flow of illegal immigrants into your country? (%)

- Concerned
- Not concerned
- Don't know / Choose not to answer




Figure 5: How concerned are you, Századvég Foundation, 2022<sup>228</sup>

Those aged between 12–34 are at highest risk of sexual violence and assault;<sup>229</sup> cases of mass sexual exploitation and abuse of children by groups made up of men predominantly with migration backgrounds are now known to have occurred across the continent, as far afield as Great Britain in the west,<sup>230</sup> and Finland in the north and east.<sup>231</sup> In the case of Finland, the Oulu child sexual exploitation scandal is significant in that the abusers (charged with crimes such as aggravated rape and

child abuse)<sup>232</sup> admitted that they had approached the victims through online channels, again demonstrating the role played by technology in catalyzing adverse outcomes in the context of migration and security.<sup>233</sup>

Migrants (men and women, boys and girls) are often targets of sexual violence and criminal behavior as well. These victims frequently face a double burden of being first victimized, and subsequently being unable (or too afraid) to report the criminal offense to local authorities.<sup>234</sup> In addition to sex crimes, vulnerable migrants (mostly women and children) are often also targeted by or coercively involved in smuggling and human trafficking activities.<sup>235</sup> Nevertheless, poor mental health among migrants is an issue taken seriously by governments and media institutions in Western countries; however the adverse consequences for the mental health of local Christians living in areas that have received high volumes of migration are essentially undiscussed.

It must be emphasized that the reaction by native populations in host societies to migrant crime can itself create new security threats that could not exist otherwise. In such situations, the public's *reaction* to uncontrolled migration or migrant crime, and the government's *perceived* inaction in the face of such phenomena, radicalizes the general public and creates internal discord.<sup>236</sup> If left unresolved, these tensions and radical feelings can lead the country further down the road toward xenophobia, the loss of social trust, and hatred<sup>237</sup>—all of which are antithetical to the common good as emphasized in Christian social teaching.

## 2.4.2. Balancing migration, security, and Christian social teaching

Migration has many faces, of which security and safety considerations are but one. In our 21<sup>st</sup> century, the focus must not be only on those in need from outside but also on the integrity of the collective societal homes within which human beings are born, grow up, and mature into agential actors during adulthood. For the West—a civilization which is inextricably connected to Christianity—the Christian principles of stewarding the home and loving one’s neighbor must be applied not only on a global scale but also domestically.

### “RECEPTION AND PROTECTION MUST BE BALANCED WITH THE HOST COUNTRY’S COMMUNAL ORDER AND COHESION

The Vatican’s position is that reception and protection must be balanced with the host country’s communal order and cohesion, as

articulated by Pope Francis in his *Twenty Pastoral Action Points*.<sup>238</sup> Beyond Catholicism, most Christian denominational authorities agree that “rapid unvetted migration at scale harms citizens.”<sup>239</sup> The moral imperative for countries accepting migration to ensure that this migration does not impede the rights of citizens (Christian or otherwise) to life and liberty is not a controversial claim; it is common-sense, and follows from basic principles of faith and reason that are universal in scope.

The two families of Orthodox Christianity<sup>240</sup> share autocephaly<sup>241</sup> as an organizational and pastoral principle,

which to some extent shapes the ways in which autocephalous churches engage with mass migration in Orthodox-majority countries. A stark difference in both openness to and acceptance of mass migration in Orthodox countries compared to Western European countries has been observed in the wake of the 2015 Migration Crisis, with Orthodox churches exhibiting greater reluctance to admit migrants out of caution. In this context, security concerns and the pastoral obligations of the Orthodox churches toward the oikos and their Christian flock both play a significant role.<sup>242</sup>

To neglect or deny the problems that emerge at the nexus of migration and security is to contradict both statistically measurable realities, as well as the lived experience of countless millions in migration-receiving countries. Such denial carries intrinsic risks: it is liable to fuel extremism and novel forms of radicalization, and in so doing, it runs counter to the interests of a Christian society.

## 2.5. The Human Costs of Migration

### Public Safety, Demography, and the Loss of Home

While the economic and criminological impacts of migration are indeed significant, the total impact of migration upon native populations cannot be measured solely by the balance sheet. A more nuanced assessment should take into account the psychological and spiritual burden felt deeply by those whose civic and religious life is altered as a direct consequence of mass migration, and its transformative impact on the daily lived experiences of human persons in said context.

In many places in Europe, there is a fear of migrants<sup>243</sup> such that indigenous Europeans feel that their country is no longer their home, explicitly because of the large number of foreigners and migrants they are in contact with.<sup>244</sup> It is notable that these fears—which may be derived rationally from real-world experiences or statistical probabilities—are often construed in a way that is highly unsympathetic to the person living in fear; mercy or understanding is almost never afforded to their perspective. Just so, some media outlets crudely construe population surveys of fear toward migrants or migration in such a way as to present those living in fear as if they were xenophobic. An example can be seen below:<sup>245</sup>

## The most anti-immigrant countries in Europe

“There are so many foreigners living here, it doesn’t feel like home any more.”




Figure 6: Graph reports how ‘anti-immigrant’ European countries are, based on residents reporting that they don’t feel at home in their own countries anymore due to the high numbers of foreigners. In this case, potentially legitimate feelings by citizens are appropriated as a proxy for xenophobic or anti-immigrant sentiment.<sup>246</sup>

These feelings of generalized discomfort are important, because they derive from real experiences accumulated by countless millions across the world in migration-target societies—not only Christian-heritage countries but also East Asian nations such as Japan and South Korea. The depiction of these feelings in conventional media narratives is also significant: it tells people that the unhappiness they feel because of mass migration is illegitimate, and therefore invalid.

It is one thing for citizens in migrant-destination countries to suffer a reduction in their subjective quality of life. It is another thing for them to suffer tangible, quantifiable attacks on their human dignity and right to life, as is the case for victims of migrant crime (i.e., rape, assault, robbery, or murder of a close friend or family member). Yet it is another thing altogether for those who suffer to be attacked and revictimized upon their disclosure of such experiences in public fora. Douglas Murray notes that:

*“Instead of addressing concerns, politicians and press began to throw accusations back at the public. This was done not just through charges of ‘racism’ and ‘bigotry,’ but in a series of deflecting tactics that became a replacement for action. All of these were identifiable [...] including the demand that the public should just ‘get over it’.”<sup>247</sup>*

Murray’s 2017 book *The Strange Death of Europe* introduced the systematic silencing of the casualties of mass migration to

the world for the first time. Unfortunately, this phenomenon has become only more severe in the years since, particularly in the European continent. In 2024, *Die Welt* reported that at least 360 police operations were enacted against social media users for sharing or appearing in TikTok or Instagram videos which contained instrumental background music determined to be ‘racist.’<sup>248</sup> In the same year, a 20-year-old German woman was imprisoned after sending insulting messages on social media to a convicted gang rapist. These messages were directed to a man of migrant background who, at the time, had been sentenced to probation without jail time for collaborating with his eight co-defendants in the group assault and gang rape of a German child (a schoolgirl aged 15) which occurred in a public park.<sup>249</sup> In this case, what appears at first to be a case of egregious judicial misconduct in the German court system (a convicted child rapist receives a probation sentence, yet a woman who insults him online is sentenced to prison time) is more correctly understood as the new, dark precedent for judicial treatment of migrant crime in the Western European nations. To the courts of Germany and France, criticizing migrant criminals, or drawing public attention to their crimes over social media, is defined by legal precedent as being equal to if not worse than the act of the crime itself. In Great Britain, despite Brexit having occurred many years ago, we find similar trends:

**GERMANY AND FRANCE  
PUNISH CRITICISM OF  
MIGRANT CRIMINALS  
MORE HARSHLY THAN THE  
CRIMINALS THEMSELVES** ”

*“British police made 12,183 arrests in 2023—an average of 33 a day—under laws that make it illegal to say something ‘grossly offensive’ or share content of an ‘indecent, obscene or menacing character’ via a public communications network—up by 58% compared with 2019.”<sup>250</sup>*

What we can conclude is that a growing body of evidence—comprised of independent investigations, media reports in the public domain, and also whistleblower reports<sup>251</sup>—shows that many European citizens who raise objections to mass migration, even when based on lived trauma, have been systematically silenced, delegitimized, or even criminalized. By construing their opposition as racist or xenophobic in nature, authorities can dismiss the content of anti-migration sentiment and punish the proponents of such sentiment directly. In Christian-heritage countries in Western Europe, like Germany or France, a primary functional consequence of mass migration is that women have lost the freedoms they previously enjoyed to go to public parks, walk the streets alone, or use public transportation without fear. Dialogues between Christians show that even while there are differences in opinion about how to solve these migration problems, the detrimental impact upon social order, the common good, and human dignity—particularly that of women—is widely accepted.

### 2.5.1. Assimilation, integration, and parallel societies

A highly relevant question concerning the topic is the difference between **assimilation** and **integration**. In the past, ‘assimilation’ was seen as the normative goal of the relationship between the immigrant and the host society. More recently, ‘integration’ has become an increasingly preferred term.<sup>252</sup> Assimilation presupposes that over time the differences between the host society and the immigrant groups will vanish or become barely noticeable. The concept of integration in comparison “is agnostic about cultural and social change.”<sup>253</sup> Regardless of the terminology used, there is an observable tendency for immigrant groups of sufficient density and quantity to organize themselves into distinct neighborhoods or local communities, set apart from the local environment deliberately to mimic their atmosphere of origin. Where these efforts to establish such communities succeed and result in pseudo-self-sufficient<sup>254</sup> communities, we call them ‘parallel societies.’

In our understanding, parallel societies emerge when two consecutive conditions are satisfied. The first is that an immigrant group within a pre-existing society has sufficiently high fertility rates to not only sustain its presence in the new social environment but also to grow.<sup>255</sup> The second is that this immigrant group, and its constituent members, have characteristics, or simply preferences, that induce a distinctive mode of life that is sufficiently removed from the surrounding context that a ‘society within a society’ self-organizes.<sup>256</sup>

A frequently discussed case of parallel society development is that of France. As a note, fertility rates in developed European countries have long since fallen below the 2.1 required for maintenance, while on the African continent, fertility is consistently two, three, or more than four times the baseline replacement rate, depending on the country in question (the continental average, according to 2023 data, is at 4.18 and falling).<sup>257</sup> In the French city of Rennes, between 1990 and 2017, the population born to non-European

“ BY 2022, AT LEAST 29% OF NEWBORNS IN FRANCE HAD AT LEAST ONE PARENT WHO WAS BORN OUTSIDE THE EUROPEAN UNION

immigrant parents increased from 7.7% to 22.8% among 0–18 year olds. In Les Portes Ferrées, 61% of 0–18 year olds were children of non-European immigrants in 2017.<sup>258</sup>

The seemingly simple trend of immigrant communities from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) demographically outcompeting indigenous French on the basis of inherited habits and preferences becomes untenable, however, when considering the fact that in some cases, the fertility rates of migrants in Europe actually exceeds the fertility rates of the same demographic groups in their country of origin. For instance, Algerian immigrants living in France have a TFR of 3.69, whereas Algerian women living in Algeria have a TFR of only 3.<sup>259</sup>

16% of Europe’s population is under the age of 15 and 20% is over 65 years old.<sup>260</sup> **By 2022, at least 29% of newborns in**

**France had at least one parent who was born outside the European Union**, and about one in five newborn boys is given a Muslim first name.<sup>261</sup> As immigrants arrive with relatively stronger pro-natalist attitudes than indigenous Europeans, they have more children to whom these attitudes are passed on, culminating in demographically vibrant—but culturally distinct—migrant communities who are then bereft of incentives to assimilate into the mainstream culture.

## 2.6. The Political Ramifications of Migration Policy

### How Migrant Influx Affects Sociopolitical Dynamics

The mass movement of peoples has, and always has had, the potential to effect change in target countries. The question as to how mass migration influences political processes, however, continues to be debated. In this chapter, we aim to contribute to this discussion from Christian principles and a biocentric perspective.

To begin, it is important to note that culture is recognized by a wide range of academic disciplines as a fundamental part of our psychological makeup.<sup>262</sup> Culture is particularly important because it influences how we behave, and how we shape our external environments in accordance with culturally dictated expectations. In human evolutionary biology, this process is referred to as *social niche construction*; it refers to the actions we take on a daily basis to change our social and physical surroundings in ways that better suit our needs, wants, and desires.<sup>263</sup> As a general rule, when two different groups try to shape their lived environments in ways that do not align, then political ramifications will follow.

Prior to the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, these ramifications were, in a sense, ‘under the radar.’ Until 9/11, the twin issues

of migration and integration remained relatively marginal in the collective consciousness and political discourse of Western countries—but that is not to say problems did not exist.<sup>264</sup> Douglas Murray, in his 2017 book *The Strange Death of Europe*, documents numerous instances where concerns regarding mass migration and integration did indeed bubble up into public awareness and media recognition from the 1990s and earlier; these concerns are most extensively documented in the Netherlands, the U.K., France, and Germany, and relate to issues such as street crime,<sup>265</sup> Islamist propaganda and provocation,<sup>266</sup> as well as the emerging phenomena of anti-gay violence<sup>267</sup> and systematic sexual violence.<sup>268</sup> Still, immigration itself was not yet the top priority issue (with election-swinging significance) that it would mature into by the 2020s.<sup>269</sup>

The denial by mainstream political parties of these social facts associated with mass migration heavily influenced the dramatic decade between 2010–2020. During this period, popular opposition to mass migration was made irrefutable by moments such as Brexit or the 2016 electoral victory of Donald Trump, yet little recognition by the political establishment was afforded to the victors who captured electoral sentiment in these instances; a ‘discursive deadlock’ between the supporters of mass migration (the political left, neoliberal economists) and the largely voiceless critics of mass migration (widely dismissed as ‘far-right’ or ‘racist’ at that time) first emerges during and subsequent to 2016.

After the Migration Crisis of 2014–2015, countries that dared to emphasize the possible downsides of issuing blank-

check welcome invitation letters to any and all ‘refugees’ (a category that is profoundly difficult for authorities to verify, as per Chapter 1.11.) were deemed radical, inhumane, cruel, or racist. Governments overseeing record levels of migration, such as the 2020–2024 Biden Administration, opted for language that strategically supported their position; specifically, the Biden Administration avoided the use of the term “crisis” in public statements related to migration, despite the record high number of illegal arrivals.<sup>270</sup>

Yet, real-estate shortages, excessive social spending, escalating crime rates, and dramatic terrorist attacks made the darker side of mass immigration increasingly undeniable for the public, on both sides of the Atlantic. By the early 2020s, denial of these problems had become an untenable strategic position. Because most mainstream parties had previously rejected the magnitude of the issue many voters turned toward political groups which were outspoken about the negatives of mass migration (e.g., Fidesz in Hungary, Chega in Portugal, or the GOP in the U.S.). Retrospectively, it seems increasingly apparent that this political moment constituted a bifurcation event in Western politics, where political parties and institutions found themselves forced to choose between one of two ways of addressing migration; we will call these ways “Path A” and “Path B.”

What we identify as ‘**Path B**’ is simple: double down on pro-migration positions, hold the policy line established in previous decades, and sometimes subtly tweak aspects of migration policy on a proximal level to keep the electorate

appeased. To see this in practice, we only need look to Germany, which has been ruled by a series of political parties in coalition for most of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, all of which favor mass migration as a matter of consensus, yet differ dramatically elsewhere in policy positions (as exemplified by the longstanding informal agreement between parties to avoid any criticism of migrants in electoral campaigns).<sup>271</sup> The natural consequence of Path B is that, by disavowing a huge swathe of public opinion, it paves the way for the emergence of new anti-immigration political movements and parties such as the AfD (*Alternative für Deutschland*) which have free rein to monopolize that territory.<sup>272</sup>

What we define as ‘Path A’ is equally simple. It requires only that mainstream political parties that already possess the confidence of the electorate act to incorporate migration concerns into their policy platform. To see this path in practice, we need only look toward Denmark—a country where the governing center-left Social Democrats (*Socialdemokratiet*) have successfully incorporated migration-realism into their existing socialist-leaning policy platform.<sup>273</sup> The advantage that Path A confers for mainstream political parties is obvious: it gives them the leg-room to confront genuine socio-political issues caused by mass migration, thus addressing the legitimate grievances and demands of the native voting population.

Path A can also be defended from a Christian perspective. Since social peace and reconciliation are essential for societies ordered toward the common good, mainstream political parties have a duty to address the legitimate concerns of their





Figure 7: Axioma, created by Wael Taji

communities rather than ignore them or allow them to worsen. When parties refuse to act, whether by endorsing large-scale immigration for ideological reasons or by remaining paralyzed out of fear of controversy, they fail in their responsibility to govern justly and neglect their obligation to protect the well-being of their citizens. In such circumstances, outsider parties gain legitimacy by responding to grievances left unaddressed, but this dynamic exposes and fosters political polarization,



which signals a deeper failure on the part of established political elites and is dangerous for it may also precede social and political disintegration.

These political ramifications of mass migration in the political realm are depicted in the graph above, which yields a procedural depiction based on real-world observations and patterns as referenced above.

While our model presented here is primarily *descriptive* (mapping the historical trajectories and bifurcation points experienced not only by Germany and Denmark, but by other European countries as well)<sup>274</sup> it may also have *predictive* utility, if our analysis is correct. The re-election of President Donald Trump in 2024,<sup>275</sup> and the successes of migration-skeptic parties in both European parliamentary<sup>276</sup> and national<sup>277</sup> elections in that same year demonstrated the popular will of voters to oppose what was then the prevailing discourse on migration matters, and to reward politicians who *did* risk their necks by speaking up about the problematic aspects of the phenomenon. It is no accident that formerly pro-migration parties such as the German Social Democrats<sup>278</sup> or the U.K. Labour Party<sup>279</sup> have recently shifted toward a more restrictionist approach, implementing similar methods to those advocated by their former political rivals.

**Part 3:**  
**Ethical Migration**  
**Policy Solutions**  
**and**  
**Recommendations**



## **3.1. How Christian Principles Can Guide an Ethical Migration Policy**

### **A Vision Based on Faith and Reason**

We advocate for an immigration policy informed by Christian principles, one that respects the inherent dignity of migrants while also recognizing the state's duty to safeguard its citizens. This perspective is grounded in the specific historical and social context of Hungary in light of the current immigration trends outlined in the preceding chapters, which call for cautious deliberation regarding who is invited, or accepted, to reside in our country. Responding to the unique realities of time and place is not at odds with Christian teaching. As St. Thomas Aquinas affirms, a wise ruler is one who governs in accordance with the particular needs of his people and the circumstances they face.<sup>280</sup>

As it is true that the Christian perspective on immigration has historically emphasized compassion and solidarity with refugees, along with a welcoming attitude toward foreigners, it is also true that it calls for a prudent balance between these values and the legitimate responsibility of rulers to protect their people.<sup>281</sup> In this context, national security, cultural and moral traditions, the rule of law, public order, and social cohesion are all essential components of what constitutes the common good.

While economic factors are considered, they do not dictate the core of a Christian immigration policy. The technocratic decision-making mindset tends to point to the economy and even demography as arguments to promote irresponsible decisions. Immigration cannot be seen as a mere tool to improve economic dynamism or raise demographic numbers, because we are dealing with human beings, with a whole complexity both in cultural and subjective individual terms, not interchangeable goods, and that is why both moral and cultural foundations are the guidelines for a good policy.

In this sense, as we stated in Chapter 1.2., the framework upon which we build our policy is summarized in these premises:

- That nations are *moral communities*, with duties to their own people;
- That migrants have *dignity*, but not an *automatic right* to enter or resettle;
- That *hospitality is not self-destruction*, and *borders can be moral*;
- That *law* and *compassion* must walk together—not in tension, but in harmony.

Based on this, we can establish an analytical framework considering six variables to evaluate immigration policies:

- Admission criteria based on moral and cultural evaluations rather than purely economic or demographic considerations.
- Strict but fair border controls.
- Rights and obligations ensuring assimilation for the benefit of the common good.

- Permanent residence and citizenship granted selectively.
- Consistent implementation mechanisms.
- Consider improving the host nation's demographic vitality, as an alternative to the constant circulation of foreign guest-workers who are used (and misused) to maintain economic prosperity.<sup>282</sup>

#### **1. Admission Criteria**

The admission criteria for a Christian immigration policy should include alignment with Christian values, a virtuous personal intent for self-betterment, thorough security screening, and a balanced cultural and demographic impact. Mass immigration should be rejected outright, as it inherently contradicts these fundamental principles. Unlike economic-driven or multicultural models, this approach prioritizes natural law, sovereignty, and cultural preservation over labor market demands or globalist frameworks.

#### **2. Border control**

Effective border control that upholds such selective admission criteria must be strict to prevent illegal entry. This requires a combination of robust physical security measures and advanced technological enforcement. Additionally, national sovereignty must be upheld, ensuring that no external pressure weakens border security or compromises the nation's right to regulate immigration according to its own principles.

### **3. Rights and obligations of immigrants**

Legal immigrants have both rights and responsibilities that ensure their integration into society without compromising national unity. They should have access to essential public services such as healthcare, education, and justice, but they must also respect national laws and the values of Christian-heritage societies, refraining from behaviors that contradict the cultural and moral foundations of the host country. To maintain social cohesion, the formation of parallel societies or cultural enclaves should not be permitted. Instead, assimilation into the host culture should be encouraged, including language acquisition and adherence to local customs.

Additionally, immigrants must aim to be financially self-sufficient, avoiding excessive reliance on state welfare for it creates incentives to exploit the system. This undermines the principle of fairness, placing an unjust burden on law-abiding citizens who sustain these programs through their labor and taxes. Furthermore, such a scenario risks distorting the role of the state, shifting it from a guarantor of the common good to an enabler of dependency and exploitation.

Finally, non-citizen immigrants should not have political influence, meaning they should not vote or engage in activism that could threaten national security, sovereignty, or social stability. This concern becomes even more pressing when certain immigrant groups actively join revolutionary movements or radical factions seeking to alter the nation's political regime. So, to preserve national stability, immigration policies must prevent the infiltration of subversive elements and ensure

that all newcomers align with and respect the existing political and cultural order rather than attempting to transform it from within.

#### **4. Acquisition of permanent residence and citizenship**

Permanent residence and citizenship should be privileges granted selectively, based on a genuine commitment to the nation's identity and the common good. This approach requires applicants to demonstrate not only respect for national culture, laws, and values but also a deep cultural and moral alignment with the host society. Such alignment must be assessed through a thorough evaluation of the applicant's assimilation.

Moreover, citizenship should not be granted solely by birthright (*jus soli*) but should instead require parental or familial integration into the national community. Without this safeguard, automatic birthright citizenship could create incentives for mass and illegal immigration, allowing individuals to exploit the system by securing citizenship for their children while bypassing legal and cultural integration requirements.

#### **5. Implementation mechanisms**

Good laws are ineffective if not properly enforced, whether due to bureaucratic inefficiency or a lack of political will. Therefore, a strong immigration policy must be backed by robust institutions and mechanisms that ensure consistent and fair enforcement. This requires key measures such as:

- An independent national immigration authority, free from undue influence by international organizations or subversive ideological movements that might push for policies contrary to national interests.
- Transparent vetting processes, ensuring that immigration decisions are made based on clear and objective criteria rather than external pressure.
- Strict penalties for illegal immigration, including deportation and legal consequences to discourage unlawful entry and exploitation of the system. Mass deportations may be a legitimate response to mass migration.
- Regular policy reviews to assess effectiveness and make necessary adjustments in response to emerging challenges.

Additionally, community involvement should play a crucial role in shaping immigration policy. Contrary to arguments that dismiss public concerns as “xenophobic,” allowing citizens to voice their perspectives reinforces democracy rather than undermining it.

## **3.2. Main Conclusions**

### **Christian communities and the stakes of migration**

Lebanon's late 20<sup>th</sup> century history is an example of how mass migration can radically transform a nation's stability, governance, and even its identity. Lebanon, founded in 1943 as a rare homeland for Middle Eastern Christians, saw its demographic and political balance undeniably changed by successive waves of Palestinian refugees, many remaining outside its constitutional framework, contributing to conflict and the eventual dominance by non-state armed groups like Hezbollah. While migration policies can meet immediate humanitarian needs, especially when immigrants are refugees, they can also create lasting demographic, cultural, and political shifts that weaken states and create havoc in host societies. The main lesson is that a comprehensive migration policy must weigh not only short-term benefits but also long-term impacts on national identity, security, and social cohesion, because once these are altered, they may be impossible to restore.

**Chapter highlights:**

- **Mass migration as it exists today is fundamentally new** —massive movements of non-aligned or even hostile peoples to another space historically only occurred in wartime or as an invasion or with extreme calamities. That is no longer the case.
- **Migration is *never* a ‘purely economic’ matter.** Migrants are human beings; their goals and desires change through life as they negotiate the new cultural environment, which they may want to change in their image.
- The way in which contemporary discourse treats the matter of migration policy **cannot be considered fully ethical**, as the interests of stakeholders who stand to gain are prioritized, whereas the interests of stakeholders who stand to lose are frequently left out.

## **Reframing migration dilemmas**

Modern migration debates are often framed as impossible moral dilemmas, because they need to balance complex issues such as compassion, law, justice, and national identity, leaving policymakers sometimes trapped in a “moral paralysis.” This, however, is just the result of the loss of an ordered hierarchy of responsibilities that can be restored through the lens of Christian ethics. Following the teachings of St. Augustine, we affirm that duties should be ordered, first to family, community, nation, and only then to outsiders, always considering of course,

situations in which humanitarian needs demand special measures. This way, justice, truth, and mercy can work together. It is also relevant to state that migration can also be judged by its fruits: whether it strengthens or undermines the common good. In short, borders are moral, compassion must respect the law, and hospitality should never mean self-destruction.

### **Chapter highlights:**

- The loss of ordered hierarchy creates false moral dilemmas.
- **There was, is and will be an order of duties. Starting from the closest/most actionable communities to the larger/more distant ones. Also, the local takes priority over the global.**
- **Consideration must be given to what promotes the common good.**
- **Hospitality should never be self-destructive; nor should gift-giving be so extreme that it impoverishes the giver. Rather, hospitality and charity to the foreigner should invigorate and embolden both the giver and the receiver of this gift. Without this foundation, reckless hospitality can become a gateway to nihilism.**

## Hungary, Christianity, and migration

Hungary's history offers a Christian ethical framework for migration that can be systematized, rooted in Saint Stephen's *Admonitions*, which combine hospitality toward the stranger with the moral order needed to preserve a Christian nation. Guests can enrich a country economically, culturally, and politically when welcomed under conditions that protect faith, peace, and the common good. Equally, Hungarian history provides ample substance for negative outcomes that can occur when migration—or even invasion—is unrestricted, and native Christian culture suffers as a consequence.

### Chapter highlights:

- **Christian and conservative thought agree on the special importance of the place of 'home.' Hungarian Christians only have one such home in the entire world: Hungary.**
- Christian governance of the past provides a precedent for rulership that puts the integrity of the home at the highest level of importance; from Orthodox Saint-Emperor Justinian to Catholic Saint-King István.
- In modern times, many people overlook the special qualities of their home; Hungarians are forgetful of their own history with respect to the Islamic occupation and how transformative and devastating this was.

### **Human migration in the present day**

Today's migration trends are unprecedented, with billions of people worldwide potentially seeking to relocate, especially to the U.S. and Europe. The EU identifies eight main drivers for human migration: demographic, economic, environmental, security, human development, socio-cultural, political, and supranational, but we also state that an often-overlooked "symbolic driver" plays a growing role: the aspirational pull of Western lifestyles, amplified by social media, celebrity culture, and even sexualization of Western women. Technology has transformed these aspirations into actionable plans: internet access and platforms like Instagram expose even remote rural populations to idealized visions of life abroad and concrete migration pathways. This mix of material and symbolic incentives fuels chain migration and is resistant to traditional deterrents. A comprehensive vision of human migration must be aware of this phenomenon for migration flows to Europe may intensify, and they might have unprecedented negative effects even for small states like Hungary.

#### **Chapter highlights:**

- Along with the main factors (such as demographic, economic, environmental, human development, security, socio-cultural, political) the "symbolic driver" of migration intentions is the most difficult to eliminate so as to reverse the causes of mass migration. Technology contributes

significantly to idealized visions lying hidden in the driving forces and strengthen them.

- **In some cases, symbolic dimensions include problematic elements such as the sexualization of host populations and the perceived ease of access to social benefits and welfare.**
- Migration intentions are explosively increasing across the third world, especially in countries where population growth outpaces economic growth and quality of life. The only effective way for Europe to modify the migration intentions of Sub-Saharan Africa would be if Sub-Saharan Africa had a higher quality of life and more idealistic attraction than Europe itself does—which cannot be subsidized by the European taxpayer.

## **Legal attitudes to migration and current prospects**

Migration law in the U.S., EU, and Hungary reflects deeper philosophical divides between liberal individualism, which prioritizes universal human rights, even for non-citizens, and communitarianism, which emphasizes sovereignty, cultural cohesion, and the obligations that states have toward their own citizens.

Both the United States and the European Union face systemic failures in migration governance: in the U.S., this has prompted radical policy shifts that respond to concerns over

economic and security risks, but also raise constitutional questions and fears about long-term labor shortages. In the EU, legal interpretation by the ECJ and ECHR remains mainly liberal and consensus on reform seems too far to be achieved. However, recent moves also signal a gradual shift toward more restrictive practices. Hungary, finally, stands apart by embedding a communitarian philosophy into its constitutional framework, treating human migration as a matter of national survival and identity preservation. In this sense, state sovereignty in demographic, political, and cultural matters is non-negotiable, even in the face of EU legal obligations.

Across all three contexts, the central dilemma remains the same: how to reconcile ethical and legal commitments to protect the vulnerable with the need for immigration systems that maintain public trust and political stability.

### **Chapter highlights:**

- Legal attitudes toward migration are currently hotly contested in key zones like the United States and Europe, while Hungary's attitudes—already quite tough—have hardened further in recent years.
- The United States has been the most innovative in discouraging migration through new solutions in addition to deportation—these include introducing financial bond payments for immigrants in certain visa categories.

## Impacts of migration on host economies

While migration can fill labor shortages and bring skilled talent to host economies, it also generates significant socio-economic challenges such as displacement of local low-skilled workers, weakening of trade unions, fiscal burdens on welfare systems, and social tensions from large-scale guest worker programs. The main dilemma lies in balancing the economic benefits for certain sectors and immigrants themselves against the broader costs to native workers, public budgets, and social cohesion. In terms of economic development, a sustainable migration policy must align labor market needs with national socio-economic priorities, applying selective and controlled entry mechanisms while ensuring that the costs and benefits are distributed in a way that does not harm the host society in any sense.

### Chapter highlights:

- Economic migration is generally viewed by academics and business elites as a net positive. **In reality, it has a destructive effect on local wages, the bargaining power of local workers, and leads to the dissolution of labor unions.**
- **This is in some cases intentional** on the part of economic elites and power brokers; it benefits the richest while weakening the social mobility of the poorer domestic classes.

### **Migration and security**

Despite the fact that most immigrants are law-abiding, uncontrolled mass immigration has also enabled the entry of individuals connected to terrorism, organized crime, and violent offenses, which poses serious public safety risks, even targeting sometimes immigrant communities themselves. Governments must confront these risks through credible screening and enforcement without relying on misleading prejudices. Again, a sustainable migration policy must integrate rigorous, realistic security measures with transparent communication, ensuring that both citizens' safety and humanitarian commitments are fairly upheld.

#### **Chapter highlights:**

- Mass migration has led to extreme crime disparities, particularly in violent and sex crimes, between natives and migrants in Western Europe.
- This pattern of crime is highly destructive to communities and invites terror into ordinary everyday public life.

## **The human costs of migration: public safety, demography, and the loss of home**

Public discomfort, often dismissed as xenophobia, is reinforced by crime, terrorism, and the perceived erosion of social norms. This is particularly relevant for women, who face heightened risks of harassment and sexual violence from certain immigrant groups. Media and political narratives frequently delegitimize these concerns, silencing victims and critics through social and legal punishment. Across Europe, cases now exist where citizens have faced harsher penalties for having critical opinions on migration than perpetrators of violent crimes. This climate, coupled with rising crime statistics and high-profile assaults, has produced a sense of lost safety and home.

Migration's demographic and cultural effects extend further through the emergence of "parallel societies," enclaves where migrant communities maintain distinct languages, customs, and values, often reinforced by high fertility rates, reshaping the cultural landscape of entire cities. These communities, insulated from mainstream life, often resist assimilation, sustaining lifestyles that diverge from national norms. In sum, long-term demographic shifts threaten to redefine national identities, leaving host societies uncertain about their cultural and political futures.

### **Chapter highlights:**

- The nature of migration that has taken place in Western Europe over the past decade has significantly undermined women's safety and restricted their freedom to participate in public life.
- Indigenous Europeans feel that their country is no longer their home, explicitly because of the large number of foreigners.
- Media platforms and political communication usually suppress open discussion about violent crimes caused by migrants.
- Continuous migration causes long-term shifts such as redefining the host nation's cultural identity leading to uncertainty of their cultural and political future.
- Many people are labeled as racist or xenophobic, simply for expressing their desire to see their country stay *theirs*—this is an unjust framing of people's legitimate desire to have a common home for their own self-expression.

## **The political ramifications of migration policy: how migrant influx affects sociopolitical dynamics**

For decades, Western mainstream parties downplayed or ignored migration-related problems such as parallel societies or rising crime, ceding the debate to radical groups. After the 2014–2015 Migration Crisis, criticism against open-door policies was still branded inhumane or racist, even as housing shortages, welfare strain, and terrorism made public concerns unavoidable. By the 2020s, denial was politically untenable, leading voters toward parties openly addressing migration's downsides, like Fidesz, AfD, or Denmark's Social Democrats. Political actors faced two paths: doubling down on pro-migration positions while making minor adjustments or integrating migration realism into mainstream politics. By 2025, most Western parties recognized the need for tighter controls, but years of overpromising and dismissing concerns had eroded their credibility, leaving the political future of migration policy in an uncertain position.

### **Chapter highlights:**

- When migrants enter a country, as any other human being does, they naturally seek to shape the lived environment to suit their needs, transforming it in their image. This effort of transformation tends to result in a backlash or reaction from the dominant culture in the society, which has already defined its social ontology and may not necessarily want that to change.

- More importantly, the transformation of social environments resulting from migration does generally lead to a divide within countries between those who are open to change, interested in novelty, and do support migration, in contrast with those who are not, and prefer things to be as they are. Thus migration also increases political divisions within society.
- In reaction to these political divisions, there is generally a common path we see followed where countries can go one of two ways. If political leaders ignore migration as a problem, accept it unconditionally, and are seen to not be in alignment with preserving the cultural and national interests of the home citizens, then third parties may spawn that capture the anti-migration sentiment and use this to speedrun their way into politics. Examples of this include the AfD in Germany. This further increases political polarization and affects government stability and formation.
- On the other hand, there is another path, as seen in countries like Denmark, where even left-wing parties are able to maintain stability by accepting migration into their policy platform as a concern. This allows these political parties to continue to capture the concerns of the general public and maintain electoral legitimacy and stability.

## 3.3. Recommendations and Policy Proposals

### 3.3.1. Recommendations

- A responsible government operating on Christian principles must consider the **vitality** of its Christian society, and the freedom of its believers to worship and live out their faith, when dealing with matters of migration.
- Hungary must establish a preference for forms of Christian hospitality that reinforce the vitality of its society rather than those which weaken it. In the same way that the Hungarian government clarifies its moral responsibilities and the hierarchy of its obligations with respect to its treatment of ethnic Hungarians born outside of the country's borders as a consequence of the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary should communicate assertively and openly the ethicality of its migration regulations and articulate that these positions are in support of the common good, natural law, and Christian charity toward fellow members of the church as a whole.
- For migration governance in the present day, countries like Hungary, which are constitutionally Christian republics, should legitimize their positions on the basis of valid precedent from previous Christian rulers, like the ones mentioned above. This is an effective communication

strategy to show that migration restrictions are not totalitarian or fascist, but wise judgments made in support of the goal of preserving healthy societies where Christianity can flourish and where Christians can live out the fullest expression of their cultural and religious lives.

- It is impossible for any government to address the root causes of migration, because the root causes in many ways are not physical but instead abstract, linked to technological and cultural changes (described in our white paper) that are beyond the scope of any one government and its policy measures. While programs like Hungary Helps should be admired for their outstanding commitment to improving the conditions for Christians and Muslims in contexts of Christian persecution, the fundamental reality is that these efforts **produce no discernible impact on global migration flows**, and as such, the Hungary Helps organization itself should be re-evaluated and potentially retooled toward a more effective purpose, such as the one proposed below.
- As the Trump Administration's reversal of skyrocketing migration under Biden shows, governments that can effectively signal to people around the world that they **are certain to fail** if they attempt to illegally enter the country can effect change in the volume of border crossings and illicit entries. Similar means that **visibly disincentivize the idea of migrating, legally or illegally**, should be studied and evaluated for implementation.
- Migration policies must focus on the combination of the protection of the vulnerable and safeguarding public trust

and promoting long-term stability. In this regard, Hungary should seek to strengthen ties with EU member states who are equally emphatic in expressing their cultural and demographic sovereignty. Salvation cannot be obtained alone; equally, no country can succeed in implementing an ethical migration policy grounded in Christian principles without the right friends and a higher power.

- Legal attitudes are shifting in the direction that the current Hungarian government has consistently maintained for more than a decade. Hungary must maintain its hardline course, which is reflective of shifting attitudes across the globe and a growing recognition as expressed through shifting legal norms of the negative aspects of migration—especially when it is uncontrolled, but also when it is legal and regulated.
- Policies should be supporting long-term national priorities instead of short-term sectoral needs. Hungary must invest in its youth and their technical and higher education, in accordance with the Christian social teaching of subsidiarity, rather than seeking to fill their capacity gaps with the sons of foreign mothers.
- Hungary should seek to follow the example of the present Trump Administration in establishing bilateral agreements with third countries to allow for the removal and deportation of unwanted illegal trespassers who conceal or refuse to disclose their nationality and/or identity. Furthermore, bilateral discussions with the government of Serbia should be opened up to negotiate a treaty whereby illegal trespassers

who violate the Hungarian border from the Serbian direction are not merely pushed back over to the other side, but instead seized, detained, and deported to their country of origin.

#### 3.3.2. Policy proposals

- **Implement legal mandate for independently commissioned ‘Cultural Cohesion Impact Report’ accompanying all future migration legislative changes**

A responsible government *must not* view immigration in relation to economic factors *alone*, because of the interconnected nature of population movements with other societal outcomes. The impact of migration in every sense (the quantitative impacts, the qualitative impacts, the effect upon the nation and its cohesiveness as a Hungarian homeland) *must* be evaluated as a basic requirement for future legislative changes that could compromise the integrity of the country, in the interests of both current citizens and future generations.

To this end, any future government policy reform on the matter of migration **should be required by law to be accompanied by an analysis or report that investigates how this change in migration will affect Hungary’s social, cultural, and religious cohesion.** This report should be legislatively defined as the responsibility of either a new state-appointed body or commission, or alternatively as

the responsibility of a trusted neutral institution that can carry out this responsibility effectively, for the good of the Hungarian populace.

These reports should be released to the public as a **procedural prerequisite** to any parliamentary votes on legislation that affects or reforms Hungary's immigration law. The law mandating this extra step (which will necessarily delay the passage of migration laws in the future) should take into account that migration is influenced to a certain extent by many bills that may be passed in a single parliamentary session, and therefore define a well-justified threshold above which the requirement to produce a Cultural Cohesion Impact Report becomes binding.

- **Christian Resettlement Visa Program**

To invite culturally and religiously compatible persons with a long-term interest in living in and contributing to Hungary in light of the country's ongoing population decline and labor shortages in key sectors, a new category of residence permit should be established, under the title of 'Christian Resettlement Visa Program' which will receive its own dedicated budget and staff to support its operational needs as a government program.

For this purpose, either a new department of the OIF should be created, or an outside governmental institution should be empowered and funded to act as a special office that receives, processes, evaluates, and recommends or declines to recommend claimants for this residence permit

class to the Immigration Office. Only Christian men and women with specific qualities and qualifications deemed necessary for permanent resettlement in Hungary will be eligible for this new visa category, if it is considered viable and beneficial for both the applicant and Hungary.

Caution should be utilized to avoid branding this initiative as a ‘Persecuted Christian Refugee Visa’—such tactics would lead to diplomatic incidents with states that contain high numbers of future eligible applicants (e.g., Egypt, Turkey, China). If implemented, this visa category will not be *primarily* aimed toward genuine refugees who are persecuted Christians in urgent crisis—there are already existing international frameworks and asylum acceptance laws to assist those individuals. Rather, it is aimed toward devout Christians with excellent professional and personal qualities who can demonstrate a compelling reason why their permanent resettlement in Hungary would benefit both them and the Hungarian people they will be living with for the rest of their years.

- **Implement laws to safeguard local communities from job loss due to low-skilled labor importation at the level of the factory and the farm**

To avoid allowing rogue businesses to replace their workforce with low-cost migrant labor that would affect workplace cohesion and unionization access, the government should consider introducing an EU national quota for the medium-sized category of SMEs, which are legally

defined by having fewer than 250 employees, annual sales less than €50m, and balance sheet less than €43m, legally defined in Act XXXIV of 2004. This should not apply to small (< 50 employees) or micro (< 10 employees) category SMEs, which are legally distinct according to legislation. This would be a method to protect Hungarian workers from replacement by cheap overseas labor.

In practice, this would mean that a company registered as an SME, category 3, with less than 250 employees (the scale of a typical single-factory or single-farm business workforce) would be legally unable to replace local low-skilled labor with cheap foreign labor from third country locations like Vietnam, Pakistan, or any other non-EU state. As shown in the white paper, such predatory business practices deprive local communities of income and devastate wage growth and socioeconomic mobility, when tolerated by irresponsible governments. Such firms would be required to maintain a workforce consisting of at least 50% EU-nationals, which does not inhibit ethnic Hungarians from Slovakia or Romania from being legally employed.

# Notes

- <sup>1</sup> “Migration is inevitable, necessary and desirable”, at opening Exhibition IOM in The Hague. *IOM*, December 15, 2017. <https://tinyurl.com/2j7zvkv>
- <sup>2</sup> Amos Barshad: The World’s Most Dangerous Census. *The Nation*, October 17, 2019. <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/lebanon-census/>
- <sup>3</sup> At the start of the war, average life expectancy fell from 66.4 in 1974 to 57.7 in 1975, then collapsed further to the record low of 36.4 in 1976. Lebanon did not recover its pre-war average life expectancy rate until 1991. Lebanon Life Expectancy (1950-2025). *Macrotrends*, 2025. <https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/lbn/lebanon/life-expectancy>
- <sup>4</sup> Hoda Baytiyeh: Can Christian Reconciliation Bring Stability to Lebanon?, *Peace Review*, Vol. 30., No. 2. (2018) 215–222. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2018.1458953>. Full text reference: “A final setback to the Christian community came with the Taif Accord, whereby much political power formerly concentrated in the hands of the Christian president was transferred to the government and the Sunni prime minister. As a result, the Taif Accord weakened the Christian president, diminishing the representation and the power of the Christians, while the Sunni and the Shi’a made gains compared to the pre-civil war situation; parliament moved from a six to five ratio of Christians and Muslims to an equal number of both. Thus, by the end of the civil war in 1990, the Lebanese Christian community was powerless, exhausted, and it was more divided than any time before.”
- <sup>5</sup> Wissam Raji: La réalité démographique au Liban. *La Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, March 22, 2021. <https://www.revuepolitique.fr/la-realite-demographique-au-liban/>
- <sup>6</sup> Paul Salem: Seven Reasons Why Lebanon Survives – And Three Reasons Why It Might Not. *Middle East Institute*, August 29, 2016. <https://tinyurl.com/3pjxk6ej>
- <sup>7</sup> Is immigration a threat to UK security? *Migration Watch UK*, May 1, 2024. <https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/520/is-immigration-a-threat-to-uk-security>

- <sup>8</sup> The prototypical historian, Herodotus, mapped out the known world into zones that were identified with their cultural inhabitants and practices—a practice nominally continued even into the present day. Thus the area within the Carpathian Mountains was called ‘Hungary’ after its inhabitants even during the period of Ottoman Turkish occupation, just as the area of Central Asia called ‘Bactria,’ is named by Herodotus after *its* inhabitants. The logic is the same.
- <sup>9</sup> Genesis narrates that one such calamity (famine) was the direct cause of the migration of the Hebrews into Egypt. (Gen 40–50).
- <sup>10</sup> The experience of Egypt and its native Christian population, the Copts, during and after the Islamic Invasion is documented extensively by Samuel Tadros in his 2013 book *Motherland Lost: the Egyptian and Coptic Quest for Modernity* (Hoover Institution Press, 2013).
- <sup>11</sup> Anthony Browne: *Do We Need Mass Immigration?* London, Civitas, 2002. 25–26.  
Douglas Murray: *The Strange Death of Europe*. London–Dublin, Bloomsbury, 2017.
- <sup>12</sup> Andrew A. Michta: Migration is Remaking Europe: Is There a Workable Path Forward for the Continent? *Hoover Institution*, September 17, 2024. <https://tinyurl.com/3vs934p3>
- <sup>13</sup> World Migration Report 2024. *IOM*, 2024. <https://worldmigrationreport.iom.int/msite/wmr-2024-interactive/>
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>15</sup> Rebecca Hamlin: ‘Migrants’? ‘Refugees’? Terminology Is Contested, Powerful, and Evolving. *MPI*, March 24, 2022. <https://tinyurl.com/28pteh98>
- <sup>16</sup> Hein de Haas – Stephen Castles – Mark J. Miller: *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. New York – London, The Guilford Press, 2020. 42.
- <sup>17</sup> The World Economic Forum is a prominent actor that both enables and leads this limited discourse, where migration is treated explicitly as nothing more than an issue of human beings (units of labor) being shuffled from one zone to another. E.g., Amy Pope: Why migration is a model for sustainable development for all. *World Economic Forum*, January 15, 2024. <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/01/migration-model-sustainable-development/>
- <sup>18</sup> Robertson McQuilkin: *An Introduction to Biblical Ethics*. Wheaton, Illinois, Tyndale, 1995. 148.
- <sup>19</sup> *Migration Studies*, Vol. 10., No. 3. (2022).

- <sup>20</sup> Rainer Bauböck – Julia Mourão Permoser – Martin Ruhs: The ethics of migration policy dilemmas. *Ibid.* 427–441, <https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnac029>
- <sup>21</sup> T. Alexander Aleinikoff – David Owen – Refugee protection: ‘Here’ or ‘there’? *Ibid.* 464–483. <https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnac002>
- <sup>22</sup> Nor in the writings of the Church Fathers, nor in the canons of any branch of Apostolic Christianity, nor in the theological positions elaborated in any Mainline Protestant denomination.
- <sup>23</sup> Ferdinand Tablan: The Common Good in Catholic Social Teaching and The Legalization of Physician Assisted Suicide. *Humanities Bulletin*, Vol. 6., No. 2. (2023) 14.
- <sup>24</sup> Bauböck–Permoser–Ruhs op. cit. 430.
- <sup>25</sup> Sarah Fine – Lea Ypi: *Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership*. United Kingdom, Oxford University Press, 2016.
- <sup>26</sup> Augustine of Hippo, *The City of God [De Civitate Dei]*, esp. bk. XIX, chs. 14–17. In: Philip Schaff (ed.) – Marcus Dods (tr.): *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, Vol. 2. Buffalo, New York, Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.
- <sup>27</sup> Heinz Schilling: *Early Modern European Civilization and Its Political and Cultural Dynamism*. Lebanon, Brandeis University Press, 2008. chs. 6–8.
- <sup>28</sup> Pope Pius XII: Exsul Familia. *The Holy See*. <https://tinyurl.com/y83sv3ts>
- <sup>29</sup> Sigrid Müller: Concepts and Dimensions of Human Dignity in the Christian Tradition. *Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society*, Vol. 6., No. 1. (2020) 24. <https://doi.org/10.30965/23642807-00601003>
- <sup>30</sup> Víctor Manuel Fernández – Armando Matteo: Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith. Declaration “Dignitas Infinita” on Human Dignity. *The Holy See*, March 25, 2024. <https://tinyurl.com/yft5efu9>
- <sup>31</sup> Common Declaration of His Holiness Francis and His Holiness Tawadros II. *Salt + Light Media*, April 28, 2017. <https://slmedia.org/blog/common-declaration-of-pope-francis-and-pope-tawadros-ii>
- <sup>32</sup> Jaroslav Franc: Matthew the Poor: Towards Modern Birth Control Methods in the Coptic Orthodox Church. *Family Forum*, Vol. 9. (2019) 173–190. <https://doi.org/10.25167/FF/1090>
- <sup>33</sup> *The Westminster Confession of Faith*. 1646.
- <sup>34</sup> International Theological Commission. The Dignity and Rights of the Human Person [1983]. *The Holy See*. <https://tinyurl.com/yc4y5b8j> 2.1.2
- <sup>35</sup> V. Bradley Lewis: Catholic Social Teaching on the Common Good. In: Gerard V. Bradley – E. Christian Brugger (eds.): *Catholic Social Teaching: a volume of scholarly essays*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2022.

- <sup>36</sup> Declaration on Religious Freedom *Dignitatis Humanae* (On the Right of the Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious) [1965]. *The Holy See*. <https://tinyurl.com/8e8ue4dk>
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- <sup>38</sup> María del Mar Gil Cruces: The Common Good according to Saint Thomas Aquinas. *Almogaren* 25 (2000), 173–177. Text of the paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Theological Center of Las Palmas, Feast of Saint Thomas, January 2000.
- <sup>39</sup> Cited by: Tablan op. cit. 12.
- <sup>40</sup> Quote: “Calling upon the great God and Jesus Christ, our Savior, and invoking His aid, we strive to keep our subjects, whom God has given to us to govern, from all damage and harm, and prohibit fights, which, undertaken through thoughtlessness, end in slaughter, and bring double penalty—that which the combatants bring upon themselves and that which the law visits upon them for their madness.” From Justinian I.: Novella 85. In: Fred H. Blume (tr.): Annotated Justinian Novels. *University of Wyoming*, 2008. <https://tinyurl.com/ykn52wrn>
- <sup>41</sup> Dr. George Demacopoulos: The Byzantine Origins of Gun Control. *Public Orthodoxy*, March 26, 2018. <https://publicorthodoxy.org/2018/03/26/byzantine-origins-of-gun-control/>
- <sup>42</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas: *De regno, ad regem Cypri* [On Kingship]. bk. 1, ch. 3.
- <sup>43</sup> Benedict XVI’s speech on Friday, 18 April 2008. <https://tinyurl.com/2at5wdtd>
- <sup>44</sup> Augustine of Hippo. *De Civitate Dei* (The City of God), Book XV, ch. 22.
- <sup>45</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, II–II, q. 26, a. 7.
- <sup>46</sup> Pope Pius XI: Quadragesimo Anno [1931]. §79. *The Holy See*. <https://tinyurl.com/4mk8z9uj>  
“[I]t is an injustice [...] to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do.”
- <sup>47</sup> Pope Benedict XVI.: *Caritas in Veritate*, 57. *The Holy See*. <https://capp-usa.org/caritas-in-veritate>
- <sup>48</sup> Vladimir Solovyov: *The Justification of the Good: An Essay on Moral Philosophy*. Michigan, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2015. 225.
- <sup>49</sup> David H. McIlroy: Subsidiarity and Sphere Sovereignty: Christian Reflections on the Size, Shape and Scope of Government. *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 45., No. (2003) 762. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jcs/45.4.739>

- <sup>50</sup> “Only when we have a vision for the common good that goes beyond the economic, and power structures which empower individuals, local communities and social institutions, will we have government which serves the people rather than enslaving them.” Ibid. 763.
- <sup>51</sup> In Strong’s Concordance Dictionary. *Bibletools*. <https://tinyurl.com/4pdmhfjr>
- <sup>52</sup> Ernst M. Conradie: The whole household of God (Oikos): Some ecclesiological perspectives. Part 1. *Scriptura*, Vol. 94. (2007) 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.7833/94-0-1431>
- <sup>53</sup> Alan R. Johnson: The Power of the Oikos. 1998. *Thai Missions Library*. <https://thaimissions.info/gsd/collect/thaimiss/index/assoc/HASHf12d.dir/doc.pdf>
- <sup>54</sup> David Bentley Hart – John Chryssavgis (eds.): *For The Life Of The World: Toward a Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church*. Massachusetts, Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2020.
- <sup>55</sup> Conradie op. cit. 1–2.
- <sup>56</sup> John 1:1.
- <sup>57</sup> See Yves R. Simon: *The Tradition of Natural Law: A Philosopher’s Reflections*. New York, Fordham University Press, 1992. 78–90, where Simon contends that modern moral paralysis stems not from complexity, but from the abandonment of a hierarchical moral order grounded in natural law. See also Gaudium et Spes, §74: “The political community exists, consequently, for the sake of the common good, in which it finds its full justification and significance, and the source of its inherent legitimacy.” *The Holy See*. <https://tinyurl.com/mr39x52h>
- <sup>58</sup> Roger Scruton: *How to Be a Conservative*. London, Bloomsbury, 2014.
- <sup>59</sup> The official translation of the National Avowal describes Hungary as a part of Christian Europe established “on solid ground” 1000 years ago, and recognizes the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood. In our understanding, this is synonymous with a Christian Hungarian homeland.
- <sup>60</sup> National Avowal [Nemzeti hitvallás]. In: *The Fundamental Law of Hungary* [Magyarország Alaptörvénye]. Ministry of Justice, 2025. <https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/en/2011-4301-02-00>
- <sup>61</sup> Justinian Code. *Corpus Juris Civilis*, bk. I, title I. See also Wolfgang Kunkel, *An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History*. United Kingdom, Oxford University Press, 1973.
- <sup>62</sup> Peter Sarris: *Justinian: Emperor, Soldier, Saint*. New York, Basic Books, 2023. 255 ff.
- <sup>63</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>64</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid. 223.

- <sup>66</sup> Marcus Tanner: *The Raven King: Matthias Corvinus and the Fate of His Lost Library*. New Haven, Yale, 2008.
- <sup>67</sup> László Kontler: *A History of Hungary: Millennium in Central Europe*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
- <sup>68</sup> These 'instruction manuals' for future rulers were conventionalized in the Middle Ages; they are referred to as 'princely mirrors' or 'mirrors for princes' by modern scholars.
- <sup>69</sup> This is treated as the first source of the Hungarian constitutional legacy (Corpus Juris Hungarici). The Admonitions of King St Stephen of Hungary: Ageless Guidance for Believers, Statesmen and Descendants. *Hungarian Conservative*, August 20, 2023. <https://tinyurl.com/9t659tjw>
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid. For an unofficial English translation, see An English Translation of the Admonitions of St. Stephen, Founder and First King of Hungary. Saint King Stephen's Mirror for Princes. *The New Digest*, February 4, 2025. <https://thenewdigest.substack.com/p/an-english-translation-of-the-admonitions>
- <sup>71</sup> It can be argued that this is still the case today, albeit widely ignored.
- <sup>72</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>73</sup> For short summaries see  
Tibor Frank: Migrations in Hungarian History – Part I–II. *Hungarian Review*, Vol. 7., No. 1. (2016); Vol. 7., No. 2. (2016).  
Miklós Kásler: Ethnic and Demographic Changes in Hungary's (More Than) 1100 Years Long History. *Civic Review*, Vol. 13., Special Issue (2017) 295–325. <https://doi.org/10.24307/psz.2017.0318>  
On the past 100 years: Andrea Gereöffy: Migration to Hungary. *Central European University*, July 2006. [https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/en/2009/04/migsys\\_hungary\\_ukrainians.pdf](https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/en/2009/04/migsys_hungary_ukrainians.pdf)
- <sup>74</sup> Balázs Sudár: The Ottomans and the Mental Conquest of Hungary. In Pál Ács – Pál Fodor (eds.): *Identity and Culture in Ottoman Hungary*, Berlin–Boston: De Gruyter, 2017. 55–68.
- <sup>75</sup> Ibid. 56.
- <sup>76</sup> Peter F. Sugar – Péter Hanák – Tibor Frank: *A History of Hungary*. Indiana University Press, 1994. 11–143.
- <sup>77</sup> Neli Esipova – Anita Pugliese – Julie Ray: More Than 750 Million Worldwide Would Migrate If They Could. *Gallup*, December 10, 2018. <https://news.gallup.com/poll/245255/record-number-worldwide-migrants.aspx>
- <sup>78</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>79</sup> Roman Hoffmann – Gregor Zens: Interrelated drivers of migration intentions in Africa: Evidence from Afrobarometer surveys. *Environmental Development*, Vol. 52. (2024). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envdev.2024.101096>

- <sup>80</sup> Phillip Connor – Ana Gonzalez-Barrera: Many Nigerians, Tunisians and Kenyans say they plan to leave their countries in the next five years. *Pew Research Center*, March 27, 2019. <https://tinyurl.com/3hw4rs7v>
- <sup>81</sup> IOM (2024) op. cit. 119.
- <sup>82</sup> Hoffmann and Zens find that approximately 80% of African potential migrants sampled would be classified as explicit economic migrants, while another 15% belong to motivational categories that can be implicitly classified as economic in nature also (Hoffmann–Zens op. cit.).
- <sup>83</sup> Connor–Gonzalez-Barrera op. cit.
- <sup>84</sup> Understanding the reasons behind migration: the interplay of migration drivers. The Joint Research Centre, December 18, 2024. <https://tinyurl.com/4akwetb9>
- <sup>85</sup> ‘Human development’ is defined by the Commission’s Report as consisting of factors such as healthcare, education, and overall infrastructure. The Report admits, however, that there is ‘mixed evidence’ about the role played by these effects. Indeed, evidence provided later in this chapter suggests that education about the world mediated through technology actually *increases* migration intentions, rather than decreasing them.
- <sup>86</sup> Jørgen Carling – Francis Collins: Aspiration, desire and drivers of migration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 44., No. 6. (2018) <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1384134>
- <sup>87</sup> Susan Frohlick – Paula Migliardi – Adey Mohamed: “Mostly with White Girls”: Settlement, Spatiality, and Emergent Interracial Sexualities in a Canadian Prairie City. *City & Society*, Vol. 30., No. 2. (2018) 165–185. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ciso.12176>
- <sup>88</sup> Migration as Reparation for Colonialism. *Res Publica*, Vol. 30. (2024) 763–781. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-024-09664-0>
- <sup>89</sup> Browne op. cit. 137.
- <sup>90</sup> Zahra Aghaee Khaleidi: *The Influence of Social Media in Shaping Migration Decision-Making of Iranian Students in Sweden: a Survey-based Quantitative Study* [Master Thesis]. Malmö University, Spring 2024. <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1873129/FULLTEXT02.pdf>
- <sup>91</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>92</sup> One video posted by Arab YouTuber ‘Rahalista’ with 2.4 million views features him exploring Berlin with an attractive German woman; a significant proportion of the comments, in Arabic, relate to the woman and her perceived sexual attractiveness rather than to the content of the video itself. Source: برلين يعيون أهلها | جولة في سوق المستعمل وتجربة اشهر مطعم دونر [Berlin through the eyes of its people | A tour of the flea market and trying the most famous Döner restaurant]. *Rahalista’ – YouTube*, May 16, 2022. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcOmWkbHiog>

- <sup>93</sup> Usta DD, Ozbilgin MF. The hidden side of migration: Understanding sexuality as an aspiration to migrate. *Front Sociol.* 2023 Jan 6;7:1027268. doi: 10.3389/fsoc.2022.1027268. PMID: 36714365; PMCID: PMC9875326.
- <sup>94</sup> Haodong Qi – Holly E. Reed – Pieter Bevelander: Can internet search data predict human migration intentions? *Comparative Migration Studies*, Vol. 13. (2025) <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-025-00450-2>
- Hernan Winkler: How does the internet affect migration decisions? *Applied Economics Letters*, Vol. 24., No. 16. (2017) 1194–1198. <http://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2016.1265069>
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- <sup>95</sup> Browne op. cit. 137.
- <sup>96</sup> Steve Morgan: Humans On The Internet Will Triple From 2015 To 2022 And Hit 6 Billion. *Cybercrime Magazine*, July 18, 2019. <https://tinyurl.com/3uy2e6py>
- <sup>97</sup> Fact Sheet: DHS Agreements With Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. *U.S. Department of Homeland Security*. <https://tinyurl.com/3xw82e57>
- <sup>98</sup> Restriction on Entry of Certain Nonimmigrant Workers. *The White House*, September 19, 2025. <https://tinyurl.com/43822e3v>
- <sup>99</sup> Josh Gerstein: Judge partially blocks Trump border wall plan. *Politico*, May 24, 2019. <https://tinyurl.com/2txnnvb9>
- <sup>100</sup> Quinn Owen: Migrant crisis explained: What’s behind the border surge. Unauthorized crossings have hit levels not seen since last spring. *ABC News*, September 23, 2023. <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/migrant-crisis-explained-border-surge/story?id=103364219>
- <sup>101</sup> (1) The key economic effects identified by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) can vary. Based on the CBO’s analysis, the recent surge in immigration is having a net positive economic impact on the federal budget (by lowering the deficits, and on the overall economy by contributing to and boosting the GDP). Positive impact on federal deficit reduction (lower by \$0.9 trillion over the 2024–2034 period, increased federal revenues because primarily from individual income taxes and payroll taxes paid by immigrants). But mass immigration also brings some negative fiscal pressures, especially for local governments and some effects on wages. However, while there might be a slowdown in wage growth, the CBO projects that after 2026, “wage growth of people in the United States who are not part of the surge increases slightly, on average, in CBO’s projections, because of higher

overall productivity from the immigration surge. That increase in productivity boosts wage growth for all groups of workers in the longer term, more than offsetting short-term reductions in wage growth for some groups.” Other negative effects include increased federal spending and local budget pressures.

See more:

Effects of the Immigration Surge on the Federal Budget and the Economy. *Congressional Budget Office*, July 2024. <https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60165>

Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Declares National Emergency to Increase our Competitive Edge, Protect our Sovereignty, and Strengthen our National and Economic Security. *The White House*, April 2, 2025. <https://tinyurl.com/5e87tfh2>

- <sup>102</sup> (2) The “national security risk” includes many considerations, but the most recent regulation called “Restricting the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorist and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats” signed by Donald Trump on the 4<sup>th</sup> of June 2025. This presidential proclamation restricting entry to the US for citizens of 19 countries, twelve of them (four of them banned from entering the US – such as Somalia, Haiti, Iran, Afghanistan, and the other seven such as Cuba, Laos, Venezuela are allowed only partial entry under certain visa categories). The aim of this regulation is to minimize the security risks from weak identity checks which are based on “the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code.” The main goal is to fix the broken immigrant system by strengthening the border security, fixing the asylum system by ending its misuse, and expanding legal immigration to reduce unauthorized migration. Security at the border is nonnegotiable and must include border barriers, more border agents, and technology to stop illegal immigration.

See more:

Restricting the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats. *The White House*, June 4, 2025. <https://tinyurl.com/276esxdu>

Neera Tanden – Debu Gandhi: A New Immigration System To Safeguard America’s Security, Expand Economic Growth, and Make Us Stronger. *CAP*, Jul 6, 2025. <https://tinyurl.com/dr26d664>

- <sup>103</sup> See more: Fact Sheet.

- <sup>104</sup> Deny to those who were born to a mother who was **unlawfully present in the U.S.** and whose father is not a citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of the child’s birth, or if the mother’s presence was lawful but temporary. See more: Donald Trump’s Executive Order 14160: Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship. *Travel.State.Gov*, January 20, 2025. <https://tinyurl.com/4brdayvw>
- <sup>105</sup> Luis Noe-Bustamante – Jens Manuel Krogstad: Americans’ Views of Deportations. *Pew Research Center*, March 26, 2025. <https://www.pewresearch.org/race-and-ethnicity/2025/03/26/americans-views-of-deportations/>
- <sup>106</sup> Alison Moodie: Trump’s New Travel Ban: Who’s affected and What to Know. *Boundless*. June 5, 2025. <https://www.boundless.com/blog/trump-new-travel-ban-countries/>
- <sup>107</sup> Restricting the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats. The White House, June 4, 2025. <https://tinyurl.com/276esxdu>
- <sup>108</sup> Jacqueline Metzler: What Are Third-Country Deportations, and Why Is Trump Using Them? *Council on Foreign Relations*, September 3, 2025. <https://www.cfr.org/article/what-are-third-country-deportations-and-why-trump-using-them>
- <sup>109</sup> “U.S. in the coming year be cut nearly in half to 18,000, down from the administration’s previous refugee ceiling of 30,000.” See more: Bobby Allyn: Trump Administration Drastically Cuts Number Of Refugees Allowed To Enter The U.S. *Npr*, September 26, 2019. <https://tinyurl.com/mua5u9ut>
- <sup>110</sup> See more: Nadine Yousif: Six big immigration changes under Trump - and their impact so far. *BBC*, January 27, 2025. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyn2p8x2eyo>
- <sup>111</sup> Carlie Procell – Ramon Padilla – George Petras: ICE drops age limit to boost recruitment. Charts show how agency is growing under Trump. *USA Today*. <https://tinyurl.com/ypakstwr>
- <sup>112</sup> DHS Terminates Haiti TPS, Encourages Haitians to Obtain Lawful status. *Homeland Security*. June 27, 2025. <https://tinyurl.com/bderay4z>
- <sup>113</sup> The environmental situation in Haiti has improved enough that it is safe for Haitian citizens to return home. We encourage these individuals to take advantage of the Department’s resources in returning to Haiti. See more: *Ibid.*
- <sup>114</sup> Deny to those who were born to a mother who was **unlawfully present in the US** and the father is not a citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of the child’s birth, or if the mother’s presence was lawful but temporary. See more: Executive Order 14160.

- <sup>115</sup> Trump's 2025 Travel Ban: Who Is Affected and What It Could Cost the U.S. Economy. *American Immigration Council*, August 6, 2025. <https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/report/trump-2025-travel-ban/>
- <sup>116</sup> Nimi Princewill – Larry Madowo: US demands up to \$15,000 visa bond for tourists and business travelers from Zambia and Malawi. *CNN travel*, Aug 6, 2025. <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/06/travel/zambia-malawi-us-visa-bond-intl>
- <sup>117</sup> Ibid. If “the visa holder departs from the United States on or before the date to which he or she is authorized to remain in the United States; or the visa holder does not travel to the United States before the expiration of the visa; or the visa holder applies for and is denied admission at the U.S. port of entry.”
- <sup>118</sup> See more: Steven A. Camarota – Karen Zeigler: Foreign-Born Population Grew by 5.1 Million in the Last Two Years. The largest two-year increase ever recorded. *CIS*, May 13, 2024. <https://cis.org/Report/ForeignBorn-Population-Grew-51-Million-Last-Two-Years>
- <sup>119</sup> In some cases, it results in **conflicts with various interests and the contemporary technocratic governance**. There could be several legal cases where the victim may also face legal charges due to some right violation. Especially when the victim filmed the violation, posted it and by this he is violating the GDPR, Article 7 (Respect for private and family life), Article 8 (Right to privacy), Article 1 (Human dignity). Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 2000/C 364/01.
- <sup>120</sup> A Christian is someone who accepts the common doctrines of Christianity and follows the teachings of the apostles. See more: C. S. Lewis: *Mere Christianity*. 1952.
- <sup>121</sup> It is crucial to remember that there are different types of humanism. Nevertheless, all humanisms somehow – more or less – try to define or carry a definite image of the “order of nature” or what it means to be a human being. All humanisms tell us something that concerns us all: they tell us what human existence is or ought to be. In a way, all humanisms guide a vision. Christian humanism: Maritain; existential humanism: Sartre, Heidegger.
- <sup>122</sup> The Schengen Borders Code is a set of rules that regulate the movement of people across internal and external borders of the Schengen area. Its goal is to balance the need for freedom of movement and the necessity of a high level of security. Schengen Code timeline: Schengen Agreement 1985; Schengen Convention 1990; Regulations 2016/399 Schengen borders; Regulation 2024/1717 amending Regulation 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders.

- <sup>123</sup> Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 establishing the EU's Visa Code.
- <sup>124</sup> A fresh start on migration: Building confidence and striking a new balance between responsibility and solidarity. *European Commission*, September 23, 2020. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_20\\_1706](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1706)
- <sup>125</sup> See more: Understanding the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. *Migration and Home Affairs News*, May 29, 2024. <https://tinyurl.com/2x9snc8f>
- <sup>126</sup> This new approach embeds migration in international partnerships to prevent irregular departures and loss of life, fight migrant smuggling, reinforce cooperation on readmission, and promote legal pathways. See more: Pact on Migration and Asylum. Embedding migration in international partnerships. *Migration and Home Affairs*, May 21, 2024. <https://tinyurl.com/nbcz3efn>
- <sup>127</sup> *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union* [TFEU]. Rome. 1957. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT:en:PDF>
- <sup>128</sup> Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 2000/C 364/01. *Official Journal of the European Communities*.
- <sup>129</sup> TFEU 2000: Article 18.
- <sup>130</sup> Non-refoulement is a core principle of EU law: TFEU. Article 78 (1). See more about the principle: Asylum Report 2024. Box 4. The principle of non-refoulement. *European Union Agency for Asylum*. <https://euaa.europa.eu/asylum-report-2024/box-4-principle-non-refoulement>
- <sup>131</sup> TFEU 2000: Article 1.
- <sup>132</sup> In 1999, the European Council was determined to establish a Common European Asylum System, based on the 1951 Geneva Convention.
- <sup>133</sup> Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013.
- <sup>134</sup> Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013.
- <sup>135</sup> Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU.
- <sup>136</sup> See more: Communitarianism. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, February 26, 2018. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism/>
- <sup>137</sup> Bas van der Vossen: Immigration and Self-Determination. *Politics, Philosophy & Economics*, Vol. 14., No. 3. (2015) 16.
- <sup>138</sup> Sarah Fine: The Ethics of Immigration: Self-Determination and the Right to Exclude. *Philosophy Compass*, Vol. 8., No. 3. (2013) 263.
- <sup>139</sup> Van der Vossen op. cit. 16.

- <sup>140</sup> Natural law theorists, for example: law is connected to the eternal law: William Ockham, St. Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius, Jacques Maritain, late Gustav Radbruch etc. Legal positivists: Thomas Hobbes, Hans Kelsen, H. L. A. Hart, Georg Jellinek. Social contract thinkers: John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Rawls. Communitarian thinkers: Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer. Some articles about the tension between these spheres: Robert B. Thigpen – Lyle A. Downing: Liberalism and the Communitarian Critique. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 31., No. 3. (1987) 637–655. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2111286>; Ömer Faruk Uysal: Revisiting communitarianism: neither liberal nor authoritarian. *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications*, July 15, 2025. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-05506-3>
- <sup>141</sup> Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace: *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*. 185§ „Subsidiarity is among the most constant and characteristic directives of the Church’s social doctrine and has been present since the first great social encyclical[395]. It is impossible to promote the dignity of the person without showing concern for the family, groups, associations, local territorial realities; in short, for that aggregate of economic, social, cultural, sports-oriented, recreational, professional and political expressions to which people spontaneously give life and which make it possible for them to achieve effective social growth.”
- <sup>142</sup> See more: Lou Newton: France expels ‘radical’ Tunisian imam Mahjoub Mahjoubi over flag comments. *BBC*, 23 February 2024. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68378736>
- <sup>143</sup> Bartosz Brzeziński, Max Griera and Hanne Cokelaere: Europe cracks down on migration. The far right is cheering. *Politico*, March 11, 2025. <https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-migration-crackdown-far-right-deportations/>
- <sup>144</sup> Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC. 11.03.2025.
- <sup>145</sup> Zac Crellin: EU plans to deport more migrants, create ‘return hubs.’ *Deutsche Welle*, March 11, 2025. <https://www.dw.com/en/eu-plans-to-deport-more-migrants-create-return-hubs/a-71893769>
- <sup>146</sup> Mallory Moench: EU court fines Hungary €200m over its asylum policy. *BBC*, 13 June 2024. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clww729180po>
- <sup>147</sup> Joakim Scheffer: EU Commission’s Migration Fines on Hungary Exceed €500M. *Hungarian Conservative*, April 23, 2025. <https://tinyurl.com/5n74vz87>

- <sup>148</sup> Right-Wing Parties in Europe Get a Boost from Recent Political Developments. *The Soufan Center*, June 6, 2025. Far-right parties, for instance: DPP (Dansk Folkeparti); AfD (Alternative für Deutschland); RN (Rassemblement National); FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs); PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid); Fratelli d'Italia; Konfederacija; Mi Hazánk.
- <sup>149</sup> “There were 1.25 million applications awaiting decisions in March 2025, an increase of 1.3% compared with February 2025. Compared with the same period in 2024, this is an increase of 6.5%.” See more: Asylum applications – monthly statistics. *Eurostat*, September 9, 2025. <https://tinyurl.com/rpc8sekp>
- <sup>150</sup> See more: Ádám Darabos et al. (forthcoming): *Family and family policy*. Budapest, Axióma Cultural Foundation.
- <sup>151</sup> See more: Jorge Liboreiro: Naval blockades are an act of war. Can Italy find a workable alternative to stem migration flows? *Euronews*, September 27, 2023. <https://tinyurl.com/3v798bfs>
- <sup>152</sup> See more: Oliver Towfigh Nia: German government unveils bill to fast-track deportations. People who are ordered to be detained pending deportation will no longer be provided with state-appointed lawyer. *Anadolu Ajansi*, June 4, 2025. <https://tinyurl.com/27k5fwb3>
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- <sup>154</sup> See more: Georgi Gotev: Commission frowns on ‘Christian only’ solidarity with migrants. *Euractiv*, Aug 19, 2015. <https://tinyurl.com/4hctmr5t>
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<sup>225</sup> **The science and psychology of migrant criminality**

The evidence reviewed above reinforces a statistical phenomenon that is well-established in the literature; first-generation immigrants to Western countries exhibit disproportionate levels of criminal behavior. In some contexts, the association between migrant status and criminality persists intergenerationally, hinting at the possibility of heritable causal factors being at play in the observable relationship. Why might that be?

Peer-reviewed findings from psychological science indicate that migrants (both international and interregional/intranational migrants) are predisposed to a **constellation of personality trait scores that is atypical in comparison to a generic population**. More specifically, migrants are likely to be higher in trait Neuroticism (predictive of emotional volatility and reactivity), trait Openness (predictive of sensation-seeking and novelty-seeking) and trait Extraversion (predictive of sociability and interest in group activities). Conversely, they are likely to be lower in trait Agreeableness (predictive of the tendency to 'get along' with others within the context of a specific social order, and exhibit lower levels of compliance). A 2024 study by Zuo et al. found that 'dark triad' psychopathological traits (Psychopathy, Narcissism, and Machiavellianism) are more prevalent in persons who migrate from place of origin to another destination. In other

words: people who migrate to unknown lands as a matter of choice are likely to be more extraverted, more open to novel experience, more emotionally reactive, less agreeable and inclined to follow rules, and more psychopathological than the native population.

From a Christian point of view, we need not interpret these findings as indicating that all migrants and refugees are pathological, immoral, or psychologically disordered. However, these psychological findings can help us to understand migrant criminality more precisely.

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- <sup>274</sup> See also the ÖVP in Austria or the RE under Emmanuel Macron in France for further examples of centrist parties which successfully defeated right-wing or hard-right parties by integrating migration restrictions into their political platforms.
- <sup>275</sup> Sareen Habeshian: Voters sour on Trump's tariffs but favor immigration policies, polls show, *Axios*, Apr 16, 2025. <https://www.axios.com/2025/04/16/trump-immigration-tariff-polls>
- <sup>276</sup> Chris Horwood – Roberto Forin: Hard winds coming: Impacts of the EU elections for mixed migration, *Mixed Migration Centre*, July 25, 2024. <https://mixedmigration.org/hard-winds-coming-eu-elections/>
- <sup>277</sup> Jessica Parker – Damien McGuinness: Far-right vote on asylum rocks German parliament, *BBC*, January 29, 2025. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ceq901dxjnzo>
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- <sup>279</sup> Prime Minister unveils new plan to end years of uncontrolled migration, *Gov.uk*, May 11, 2025. <https://tinyurl.com/43fnf2cc>
- <sup>280</sup> Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I–II, q. 96, a. 1–2.
- <sup>281</sup> The theoretical development for this was presented in Chapter 1.2. However, it is also relevant to mention the statement given by Pope Benedict XVI at the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2008 regarding sovereignty as “the responsibility to protect,” a responsibility that is not merely derived from human consent but a natural mandate of divine law. See Kevin L. Flannery: The Moral Principles Governing the Immigration Policies of Politics. In: Gerard V. Bradley – E. Christian Brugger (eds.): *Catholic Social Teaching: A Volume of Scholarly Essays*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, July 12, 2019. 365–386. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108630238>
- <sup>282</sup> See more: Darabos et al. op. cit.

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The Axioma Center (Axioma Központ) is a Christian think-tank in Hungary that aims to impact society through research, education and media, grounded in faith and reason. Our aim is to promote individual and social fulfilment, to protect human dignity and to promote the common good.

We believe that a responsible society is sensitive to people’s physical and spiritual needs—among which is the intrinsic need for vitality, stability, and safety in their local environments. These needs must be respected by the legal system, recognized as relevant in culture, and given voice in the activities of religious and civil communities. Governments and international organizations that assign higher priority to the immediate economic benefits of mass migration over the fulfillment of these needs among the populace invite fracture, volatility, and sometimes danger into the collective home of their citizens.

We are convinced that successful human communities are built on pillars embedded with profound meaning. The absolute protection of life means weighing the risk to life and liberty posed by unvetted or poorly vetted entrants, especially to vulnerable stakeholders in society like women, children, and the elderly. Upholding human dignity means preserving a space where the cultural and religious existence of native citizens is neither derailed nor overturned. Christian ethics means virtuous hospitality, but not imprudent hospitality which produces bitter and tragic fruits for future generations to deal with. The fourth paper of the Axioma Center, *Migration and Ethics*, has been prepared for this purpose.

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“Migration and Ethics’ not only aptly diagnoses the problems we all face, but they have produced an in-depth set of classical and Christian axioms which are accessible to policy-makers of all stripes. This is an essential white paper for re-building a Christian civilization.”

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“This is one of the great challenges of our modern times, and I am glad that Axioma, in this whitepaper, proposes to deal with that challenge from a perspective that is grounded in Christian ethics and human truths.”

***Rev. Fr. Youssef Khalil***

*Coptic Church of the Blessed Virgin Mary and Archangel Michael in Budapest*

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“These recommendations are particularly timely in today’s political climate, where migration issues are often the subject of polarized discourse. The publication is also significant for research into the social and ethical aspects of migration and can serve as a basis for the formulation of migration policies that respect human dignity, both in Hungary and on the international stage.”

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